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Identifying and Countering Fake News
MARK VERSTRAETE, JANE R. BAMBAUER & DEREK E. BAMBAUER†
Fake news presents a complex regulatory challenge in the increasingly democratized and
intermediated on-line information ecosystem. Inaccurate information is readily created by actors
with varying goals, rapidly distributed by platforms motivated more by financial incentives than
by journalistic norms or the public interest, and eagerly consumed by users who wish to reinforce
existing beliefs. Yet even as awareness of the problem grew after the 2016 U.S. presidential
election, the meaning of the term “fake news” has become increasingly disputed and diffused.
This Article first addresses that definitional challenge, offering a useful taxonomy that classifies
species of fake news based on two variables: their creators’ motivation and intent to deceive. In
particular, it differentiates four key categories of fake news: satire, hoax, propaganda, and
trolling. This analytical framework can provide greater rigor to debates over the issue.
Next, the Article identifies key structural problems that make each type of fake news difficult to
address, albeit for different reasons. These include the ease with which authors can produce usergenerated content online and the financial stakes that platforms have in highlighting and
disseminating that material. Authors often have a mixture of motives in creating content, making
it less likely that a single solution will be effective. Consumers of fake news have limited incentives
to invest in challenging or verifying its content, particularly when the material reinforces their
existing beliefs and perspectives. Finally, fake news rarely appears alone: it is frequently mingled
with more accurate stories, such that it becomes harder to categorically reject a source as
irredeemably flawed.
Then, the Article classifies existing and proposed interventions based upon the four regulatory
modalities catalogued by Larry Lessig: law, architecture (code), social norms, and markets. It
assesses the potential and shortcomings of extant solutions.
Finally—and perhaps most importantly—the Article offers a set of model interventions, classified
under the four regulatory modalities, that can reduce the harmful effects of fake news while
protecting interests such as free expression, open debate, and cultural creativity. It closes by
assessing these proposed interventions based upon data from the 2020 election cycle.
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INTRODUCTION
The concept of fake news exploded onto the American political, legal, and
social landscape during the 2016 presidential campaign. Since then, the term has
become ubiquitous, serving as both explanation and epithet. Some political
commentators suggested that fake news played a decisive role in the closely
contested 2016 presidential election results.1 President Donald Trump employed
“fake news” as a favorite insult in contexts from discussions about unfavorable
polling data to the journalistic integrity of CNN.2 By now, the term has been
used to refer to so many things that it seems to have completely lost its power to
describe; as a result, some media critics have recommended abandoning the
moniker entirely.3 Although the term “fake news” is perhaps confusing, some of
the concepts it denotes constitute real threats to meaningful public debate on the
internet.
Worse still, fake news appears to be an unrelenting phenomenon within the
American social and political spheres. Despite repeated interventions by social
media companies—including Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube—fake news
seems to be only gaining traction, rather than receding.4 Propaganda flourished
in the wake of the 2020 election as President Trump’s supporters stormed the
Capitol in an attempt to prevent certification of an election that they claim was
rife with fraud and misconduct.5 And, even as political topics receded, fake news
about subjects such as vaccinations against the novel coronavirus increased.6
In this Article, we bring clarity to the debate over fake news, explain why
so many proposed solutions are unable to strike at the root of the problem, and
offer potential pathways for designing more robust interventions. We begin with
some important taxonomical work. We argue that fake news is not a monolithic
phenomenon; instead, we can usefully categorize different types of fake news
along two axes: whether the author intends to deceive readers and whether the
story is financially motivated.
1. Oliva Solon, Facebook’s Failure: Did Fake News and Polarized Politics Get Trump Elected?, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 10, 2016, 5:59 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/nov/10/facebook-fakenews-election-conspiracy-theories. But see Brendan Nyhan, Five Myths About Misinformation, WASH. POST
(Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/five-myths/five-myths-about-misinformation/2020/
11/06/b28f2e94-1ec2-11eb-90dd-abd0f7086a91_story.html (disputing claim).
2. Callum Borchers, ‘Fake News’ Has Now Lost All of Its Meaning, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/09/fake-news-has-now-lost-all-meaning.
3. See, e.g., Joshua Habgood-Coote, Stop Talking About Fake News!, 62 INQUIRY 1033 (2018); Alice E.
Marwick, Why Do People Share Fake News? A SocioTechnical Model of Media Effects, 2 GEO. L. TECH.
REV. 474, 475–76 (2018).
4. See Emily Stewart, America’s Growing Fake News Problem, in One Chart, VOX (Dec. 22, 2020, 2:20
PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/12/22/22195488/fake-news-social-media-2020.
5. Claire Wardle, The Information Ecosystem that Led to the Capitol Attack, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 8, 2021,
4:48 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2021/01/08/opinion/misinformation-campaign-that-led-capitol-attack.
6. See Kaya Yurieff & Oliver Darcy, Facebook Vowed to Crack Down on Covid-19 Vaccine
Misinformation but Misleading Posts Remain Easy to Find, CNN: BUS. (Feb. 8, 2021, 11:55 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/07/tech/facebook-instagram-covid-vaccine/index.html.
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By organizing fake news according to motivations and intent, we not only
gain a more accurate understanding of the phenomenon, but also provide a
potential roadmap for delineating successful interventions from non-starters. We
argue that many proposed—and recently implemented—solutions are aimed
primarily at the financial motivations that drive fake news’ production.
Importantly, however, not all fake news is motivated by profit. Propaganda,
unlike hoaxes and satires, is created to influence political discourse, rather than
turn a profit. As a result, merely undercutting the financial incentives of fake
news production is unlikely to remedy the problem.
However, the inability of any single solution to address the complex
landscape of fake news is not reason for dismay. Solutions can be tailored to
address specific types of fake news.7 For instance, hoaxes respond particularly
well to financial incentives, so attacking the economic model for these stories is
likely to quickly eliminate their creation and spread. Propaganda, by contrast,
poses a difficult problem for any regulation of fake news. In our descriptive
section, we address unique features of propaganda—its mixture of fact and
fiction—that make crafting solutions difficult. Traditional fact-checking is
unlikely to be successful because often conspiracy theories have a kernel of truth
that enables their creators to artfully mix fact and fiction in a way that upends
traditional modes of debunking information.
Finally, we assess potential hurdles to any successful regulation of fake
news. In particular, we array potential solutions along Larry Lessig’s famous
modalities of regulation: code, norms, markets, and law, and then discuss their
potential benefits and shortcomings.8 The key feature of this analysis is that
prioritizing any one of these regulatory tools is likely to be largely unsuccessful
and may potentially have negative unintended consequences. This Article
singles out propaganda as the most vexing problem and offers potential
remedies, including creating new, trusted intermediaries that are not subject to
traditional funding structures.
We are not alone in our concern over fakes news. Commentators voice
unequivocal alarm over false yet popular information and the outcomes it helps
generate. Falsehoods about vaccines,9 including that they will contain a tracking
microchip,10 have created significant reluctance to be immunized in a range of
7. See generally Robert Post & Miguel Maduro, Misinformation and Technology: Rights and Regulation
Across Borders, in GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 2020: SEEKING SAFETY, KNOWLEDGE, AND SECURITY IN A
TROUBLING ENVIRONMENT (2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3732537.
8. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 123 (2006).
9. See LESLEY CHIOU & CATHERINE E. TUCKER, FAKE NEWS AND ADVERTISING ON SOCIAL MEDIA: A
STUDY OF THE ANTI-VACCINATION MOVEMENT (2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3209929.
10. See Fact Check: RFID Microchips Will Not be Injected With the COVID-19 Vaccine, Altered Video
Features Bill and Melinda Gates and Jack Ma, REUTERS (Dec. 4, 2020, 7:41 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/uk-factcheck-vaccine-microchip-gates-ma/fact-check-rfid-microchips-will-not-be-injected-with-thecovid-19-vaccine-altered-video-features-bill-and-melinda-gates-and-jack-ma-idUSKBN28E286.
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countries.11 Harvard’s Berkman Klein Center has produced a series of empirical
studies of fake news.12 The first, from 2017, concluded that misinformation
played a stronger role for politically conservative media outlets during the 2016
election campaign than it did for politically liberal ones.13 The second, from
2020, argued that mass media and political elites, such as Fox News and
President Trump, were far more effective in spreading disinformation than social
media platforms were.14 Some legal scholars, such as Alan Chen, defend fake
news on second-order instrumental grounds: fake news, he contends, serves as
a valuable signal for social identification and grouping, regardless of
truthfulness.15 Others, such as Robert Chesney and Danielle Keats Citron, see
the increasing sophistication of fake news as a threat to national security.16 Abby
K. Wood and Ann M. Ravel propose transparency regulation as a means of
combatting fake news in online political ads.17 And Alice Marwick and Rebecca
Lewis examine internet subcultures and the mechanisms by which “attention
hacking” allows particular actors to manipulate the media.18
The rest of this Article unfolds as follows. Part I describes several distinct
phenomena that have all been placed under the rubric “fake news.” We
categorize these distinct phenomena and demonstrate how different incentives
drive their production. By placing these developments in a matrix, the Article
demonstrates both how they are related and how regulatory solutions have crosscutting effects among them. Part II elucidates critical challenges with any
intervention that seeks to reduce the harmful influences of fake news. Part III
11. See Mark John, Public Trust Crumbles Amid COVID, Fake News – Survey, REUTERS (Jan. 12, 2021,
11:10 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-global-trust/public-trust-crumbles-amid-covidfake-news-survey-idUSL8N2JM2V9.
12. See infra notes 13–14.
13. ROB FARIS, HAL ROBERTS, BRUCE ETLING, NIKKI BOURASSA, ETHAN ZUCKERMAN, & YOCHAI
BENKLER, PARTISANSHIP, PROPAGANDA, AND DISINFORMATION: ONLINE MEDIA AND THE 2016 U.S.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2017), https://cyber.harvard.edu/publications/2017/08/mediacloud. The report mixes
the terms “misinformation,” “disinformation,” and “fake news”; we do not make any semantic distinctions
among the terms aside from those in the report itself.
14. YOCHAI BENKLER, CASEY TILTON, BRUCE ETLING, HAL ROBERTS, JUSTIN CLARK, ROB FARIS, JONAS
KAISER, & CAROLYN SCHMITT, MAIL-IN VOTER FRAUD: ANATOMY OF A DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN (2020),
https://cyber.harvard.edu/publication/2020/Mail-in-Voter-Fraud-Disinformation-2020.
15. Alan K. Chen, Free Speech, Rational Deliberation, and Some Truths About Lies, 62 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 357, 358 (2020) (arguing that fake news has intrinsic worth for its role in facilitating social cohesion among
individuals with certain beliefs and further, that this promotes listener autonomy which ought to be considered
a First Amendment value).
16. Robert Chesney & Danielle Keats Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy,
and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753, 1754 (2019).
17. Abby K. Wood & Ann M. Ravel, Fool Me Once: Regulating ‘Fake News’ and Other Online
Advertising, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 1223, 1228 (2018) (proposing regulatory interventions that promote
transparency including a requirement that social media companies save both political communications and data
about these posts in order to allow third party groups to flag disinformation and facilitate other enforcement
actions).
18. ALICE MARWICK & REBECCA LEWIS, DATA SOC’Y & RSCH. INST., MEDIA MANIPULATION AND
DISINFORMATION ONLINE 20 (2017).
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surveys current regulatory approaches, assessing which methods of constraint
are best suited to deal with particular species of fake news. The Article contends
that applying single interventions in isolation as a panacea to solve fake news
problems is often unwise. In particular, propaganda—the most serious type of
fake news threat—requires new insights to combat its effects. Finally, Part IV
offers a set of model reforms that can ameliorate fake news problems and
evaluates the costs and benefits each one poses.

I. A TYPOLOGY OF FAKE NEWS
This Section provides a new way of organizing different types of fake news
according to their distinctive attributes. The two defining characteristics used to
identify species of fake news are, first, whether the author intends to deceive
readers and, second, whether the motivation for creating or disseminating the
fake news is financial or not.
FIGURE 1: CATEGORIES OF FAKE NEWS BY MOTIVATION AND INTENT

These distinctions are useful for several reasons. Isolating intent to deceive
provides a way to distinguish between types of fake news along moral lines:
intentional deception is blameworthy. And further, revealing a person or entity’s
motivations for creating or disseminating fake news can assist in reducing
incentives to do so or deterring these activities. Overall, identifying different
characteristics of fake news also helps to evaluate which solutions will be most
effective at combating the different types of fake news.
Our framework identifies and defines several distinct categories of fake
news. First, “satire” is a news story that does not intend to deceive, although it
has purposefully false19 content, and is generally motivated by non-pecuniary
interests, although financial benefit may be a secondary goal. A paradigmatic
19. “False” can refer to either the content of the story being untrue, such as in the humor publication The
Onion, or the presentation of a true story that satirizes the delivery and performance of traditional news sources,
such as the cable television program The Colbert Report.
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example of satire is the mock online newspaper The Onion.20 The Onion
presents factually untrue stories as a vehicle for critiques or commentaries about
society. For example, one article treats the issues of opioid addiction and
prescription drug abuse, under the headline “OxyContin Maker Criticized For
New ‘It Gets You High’ Campaign.”21 Another critiques recent attacks by
conservative politicians on alleged censorship of their perspectives with the
article, “Conservatives Accuse Nature Of Silencing Right-Wing Voices After
Sheldon Adelson Dies At 87.”22 Writers for The Onion do not seek to deceive
readers into believing the story’s content. Scott Dickers, founder of The Onion,
expressed this point when he said that if anyone is fooled by an Onion piece, it
is “by accident.”23
Typically, people who take Onion stories at face value have little
experience with U.S. media norms. For example, Iranian state media reported as
fact an Onion article claiming that Iranian Prime Minister Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad was more popular with rural U.S. voters than President Barack
Obama.24 When people take an Onion article as true, they often miss the
underlying critical commentary, which is the raison d’etre for the article.
Second, a “hoax” is a news story with purposefully false content that is
intended by the author to deceive readers into believing incorrect information,
and that is financially motivated. Examples of hoaxes include the false stories
created by Macedonian teenagers about Donald Trump to gain clicks, likes,
shares, and profit. In a Buzzfeed report, these teenagers admitted “they don’t care
about Donald Trump”; Buzzfeed characterized their fake news operations as
merely “responding to straightforward economic incentives.”25 Typically the
Eastern European teens who create hoaxes do not have political or cultural
motivations that drive the production of their fake news stories.26 They are
simply exploiting the economic structures of the digital media ecosystem to
create intentionally deceptive news stories for financial reward.
20. See generally THE ONION, http://www.theonion.com (last visited Mar. 21, 2022).
21. OxyContin Maker Criticized for New “It Gets You High” Campaign, THE ONION (July 10, 2017, 10:33
AM), http://www.theonion.com/article/oxycontin-maker-criticized-new-it-gets-you-high-ca-56373.
22. Conservatives Accuse Nature of Silencing Right-Wing Voices After Sheldon Adelson Dies at 87, THE
ONION (Jan. 12, 2021, 12:00 PM), https://politics.theonion.com/conservatives-accuse-nature-of-silencing-rightwing-voi-1846042894.
23. Ben Hutchinson, “The Onion” Founder: We Do Satire Not Fake News, WISN-TV (Feb. 15, 2017,
10:38 PM), http://www.wisn.com/article/the-onion-founder-we-do-satire-not-fake-news/8940879 (implying
that writers at The Onion do not intend to deceive readers).
24. Kevin Fallon, Fooled by “The Onion”: 9 Most Embarrassing Fails, THE DAILY BEAST (July 14, 2017,
2:47
AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/09/29/fooled-by-the-onion-8-most-embarrassingfails.html.
25. Craig Silverman & Lawrence Alexander, How Teens in the Balkans Are Duping Trump Supporters
with Fake News, BUZZFEED: WORLD (Nov. 3, 2016, 7:02 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/howmacedonia-became-a-global-hub-for-pro-trump-misinfo.
26. See Robyn Caplan, How Do You Deal With a Problem Like Fake News?, DATA & SOC’Y: POINTS (Jan.
5,
2017),
https://points.datasociety.net/how-do-you-deal-with-a-problem-like-fake-news-80f9987988a9
(labeling sites built by Macedonian teens as a “black and white” case of fake news).
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Third, “propaganda” is news or information with purposefully biased or
false content intended by its author to deceive the reader and that is motivated
by promoting a political cause or point of view, regardless of financial reward.27
The controversy surrounding Hillary Clinton’s health leading up to the 2016
election is a classic example of propaganda.28 The controversy started when a
2016 YouTube video was artfully edited to piece together the most disparaging
images of Hillary Clinton coughing.29 The story was reposted and amplified by
people with a political agenda.30 And, the controversy reached critical mass
when it appeared Hillary Clinton had fainted.31 The story was not entirely
fiction—Hillary Clinton in fact had pneumonia—but the story was deceptively
presented to propagate a narrative about Clinton’s long-term health and
influence political results.
Finally, “trolling” presents news or information with biased or fake content
that is intended by its author to deceive the reader,32 and is motivated by an
attempt to get personal humor value (the lulz).33 One example that captures the
spirit of trolling is Jenkem.34 The term “Jenkem” first appeared in a New York
Times article that described youth in Africa inhaling bottles of fermented human
waste in search of a high.35 At some point, Jenkem started appearing in internet
forums as a punchline or conversation stopper.36 In the online forum Totse, a
user called Pickwick uploaded pictures of himself inhaling fumes from a bottle
labeled “Jenkem.”37 The story made its way to 4chan—another online forum—
where users posted the images and created a form template to send e-mails to
school principals, hoping to trick them into thinking that a Jenkem epidemic was
sweeping through their schools. The form letter was written to present the
perspective of a concerned parent who wanted to remain anonymous to avoid
incriminating her child but also wanted to inform the principal about rampant
Jenkem use among the student body. Members of 4chan forwarded the fake
letter widely, and the story (or non-story) was eventually picked up by a sheriff’s
27. Gilad Lotan, Fake News Is Not the Only Problem, DATA & SOC’Y: POINTS (Nov. 22, 2016),
https://points.datasociety.net/fake-news-is-not-the-problem-f00ec8cdfcb#.8r92obruo (offering a similar
definition of propaganda as “[b]iased information — misleading in nature, typically used to promote or publicize
a particular political cause or point of view ”).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. While one can never be certain about what motivates behavior, it is likely this was in large part
politically motivated.
31. Lotan, supra note 27.
32. The nature of the deception may vary. Some trolling authors do not intend to deceive readers about the
story’s content but seek to agitate readers through deception about the author’s own authenticity or beliefs.
33. Lulz, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/lulz
(defining term as “fun, laughter, or amusement, especially [when] derived at another’s expense”).
34. WHITNEY PHILLIPS, THIS IS WHY WE CAN’T HAVE NICE THINGS: MAPPING THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN ONLINE TROLLING AND POPULAR CULTURE 3–5 (2015).
35. Id. at 3.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 3–4.
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department in Florida; later, several local Fox News affiliates ran specials on the
Jenkem epidemic.38
This framework, based on intent to deceive and the source of motivation,
can bring greater clarity to discourse about fake news. The next Section
addresses instances that cross the boundary lines of this model and responds to
the challenges inherent in its methodology.

II. CHALLENGES
This Part explores why some fake news embodies characteristics of several
species or exists in a gray or indeterminate area.39 It also assesses associated
potential difficulties in making determinations about where a specific instance
of fake news falls in our matrix.
A. MIXED INTENT
Determining intent is a challenge, although hardly one unique to our
approach. Understanding the precise intentions that undergird a certain act is
difficult and typically requires the use of indirect evidence or proxies. Most
theories of intent conceptualize it as a private mental state that motivates a
particular action.40 At present, we cannot directly measure other peoples’
thoughts. Legal doctrines recognize this difficulty and often distinguish between
subjective and objective intent.41 Subjective intent is the actual mental state of
the person acting, as experienced by that actor.42 This differs from objective
intent, which considers outward or external manifestations of intent and then
determines how a reasonable person would understand the actor’s intentions
based on those manifestations.43
This difficulty has not been insurmountable for federal regulations that
hinge on determinations about intent. Take, for instance, the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), which brings products under the purview of the Food
38. When the story was picked up by the sheriff’s department, Pickwick distanced himself from it and
admitted that the images were fake. Without Pickwick, users forwarded the letter—knowing it was false—in an
attempt to deceive school administrators and create a fake news story that they found humorous. Id. at 4–5.
39. Caplan, supra note 26.
40. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (1962).
41. R. George Wright, Objective and Subjective Tests in the Law, 16 U.N.H. L. REV. 121, 121 (2017).
42. Instances of subjective intent in the law include tort doctrine, where an act can result, or not result, in
liability depending upon the actor’s subjective knowledge and goals. See DAN DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN &
ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 29 (2d ed., 2011).
43. Objective intent is a common approach to dealing with intent issues in different areas of law. One of
the most well-known examples of deferring to objective intent is issues surrounding contract formation. That is,
whether a contract is formed depends on whether an observer would consider the outward actions of a party as
indicative of intending to form a binding agreement irrespective of whether a party intends to do so. See Lucy
v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 521 (Va. 1954) (holding that a contract is still validly formed even if the party to the
contract entered into the contract as a joke and did not actually mean to be bound by the agreement); see also
Keith A. Rowley, You Asked for It, You Got It…Toy Yoda: Practical Jokes, Prizes, and Contract Law. 3 NEV.
L.J. 526, 528–29 (2003) (discussing the Zehmer case at length).
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and Drug Administration (FDA) if they are intended to be used as food or drug
products.44 Similarly, a federal statute criminalizes possession of “a hollow
piece of glass with a bowl on the end . . . only if it is intended to be used for
illicit activities.”45 And the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) only regulates
vehicles that are intended for flight.46
Although many federal regulations have successfully managed the problem
of identifying intent, this is still a complication for determinations about fake
news websites. For instance, Paul Horner—who has been dubbed the impresario
of fake news by the Washington Post47—ran a website that published news
stories that were untrue and used a mark that closely resembled that of CNN.48
Horner considered himself a satirist and other commentators claimed that the
site was “clearly satire,”49 yet the close similarity between the real CNN and
Horner’s version often fooled people into viewing the site as disseminating true
information.50
In our matrix, the distinction between hoax and satire turns on whether the
author intended to deceive the audience into thinking that the information is true.
Making sound determinations about an author’s intent is important because
potential solutions should not sweep up satire in an attempt to filter out hoaxes.51
In crafting solutions, regulators will likely have to decide between assessing the
format and content of the article to determine whether it was likely that the
author intended to deceive (objective intent) or inquiring into whether the author
actually intends to deceive (subjective intent). Both involve challenging
subjective decisions, though ones that are also trans-substantive (occurring
across multiple areas of law).52 These determinations about intent are fact44. See Christopher Robertson, When Truth Cannot Be Presumed: The Regulation of Drug Promotion
Under an Expanding First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 545, 547 (2014).
45. 21 U.S.C. § 863 (2012) (defining “drug paraphernalia” as “any equipment…which is primarily
intended or designed for . . . introducing into the body a controlled substance”); see also Robertson, supra note
44, at 549. However, some commentators suggest that this regulatory scheme may unconstitutionally burden
speech. See Jane R. Bambauer, Snake Oil, 93 WASH. L. REV. 73, 100 (2017).
46. 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2013); see Robertson, supra note 44, at 549–50.
47. Caitlin Dewey, Facebook Fake-News Writer: ‘I Think Donald Trump is in the White House Because
of Me’, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/11/17/
facebook-fake-news-writer-i-think-donald-trump-is-in-the-white-house-because-of-me.
48. See cnn.com.de (Paul Horner’s website).
49. Sophia McClennen, All “Fake News” Is Not Equal—But Smart or Dumb It Grows from the Same Root,
SALON (Dec. 11, 2016, 3:00 PM), http://www.salon.com/2016/12/11/all-fake-news-is-not-equal-but-smart-ordumb-it-all-grows-from-the-same-root.
50. A Buzzfeed article characterized Paul Horner’s site as “meant to fool,” which could make it more
representative of a hoax and not satire under our analysis. See Ishmael N. Daro, How A Prankster Convinced
People the Amish Would Win Trump the Election, BUZZFEED (Oct. 28, 2016, 5:03 PM),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/ishmaeldaro/paul-horner-amish-trump-vote-hoax.
51. This assumes that most people find value in satirical news and want it preserved. We think this is
largely uncontroversial.
52. See generally David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law, 2013 BYU L.
REV. 1191 (2013); Stephen Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the
“One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377 (2010).
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specific and complicated. Worse still, disclaimers about a site publishing false
news stories are often buried in fine print at the bottom of the page, and some
fake news stories reveal themselves to be fake in the article itself, which can be
a problem in a media culture where many people do not read past the headlines.53
The uncritical consumption of fake news divides responsibility among
several actors: authors (who intend to deceive), platforms (that are optimized to
promote superficial engagement by readers),54 and, finally, readers themselves
(who often do not engage with an article beyond the headlines).55 Although there
is shared responsibility, it is futile to place a significant share of the burden to
solve fake news on readers. Readers operate in digital media ecosystems that
incentivize low-level engagement with news stories, and digital platforms are
crucial tools for the circulation of intentionally deceptive types of fake news.56
Efforts to educate readers to become more sophisticated consumers of
information are laudable but likely will have only marginal effects. Thus,
solutions must center on platforms and authors because they will be more
responsive to interventions than readers.
B. MIXED MOTIVES
The problem of mixed motives involves two connected difficulties:
epistemic and administrative. The epistemic problem of mixed motives is similar
to the problem of deciphering intent in that it grows out of the inherent ambiguity
of interpreting a person’s actions. In short, people act for a variety of reasons;
actions driven by different reasons can sometimes produce the same results, and
with access only to people’s actions (the results), it can be difficult to

53. See Leonid Bershidsky, Opinion, Fake News is All About False Incentives, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 16,
2016, 9:26 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-11-16/fake-news-is-all-about-false-incentives
(describing how many people do not engage with stories beyond the headline).
54. Brett Frischmann & Evan Selinger, Why It’s Dangerous to Outsource Our Critical Thinking to
Computers, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/10/
google-facebook-critical-thinking-computers (arguing “[t]he engineered environments of Facebook, Google,
and the rest have increasingly discouraged us from engaging in an intellectually meaningful way. We, the
masses, aren’t stupid or lazy when we believe fake news; we’re primed to continue believing what we’re led to
believe”).
55. How
Americans
Get
Their
News,
A M.
PRESS
INST.
(Mar.
17,
2014),
https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/publications/reports/survey-research/how-americans-get-news
(explaining that most Americans do not invest time reading news stories beyond the headlines); see also Chris
Cillizza, Americans Read Headlines. And Not Much Else, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/03/19/americans-read-headlines-and-not-much-else
(quoting from the American Press Institute study).
56. Luke Munn, Angry by Design: Toxic Communication and Technical Architecture, 7 HUMANS & SOC.
SCIS. COMMS. 53, 53 (2020) (“Based on engagement, Facebook’s Feed drives views but also privileges
incendiary content, setting up a stimulus—response loop that promotes outrage expression.”).
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comprehend the motivations behind them.57 This complicates classifications
based on motivations for acting.
The debunked Pizzagate story illustrates the problem of mixed motives.
Users on 4chan and Reddit promulgated the theory—Pizzagate—that members
of the Democratic Party leadership were involved in a child sex trafficking ring
operating from a Washington, D.C. pizza restaurant.58 One conspiracy theorist
entered the restaurant armed with an assault rifle and a handgun, firing several
rounds during a (fruitless) search for tunnels or hidden rooms that he believed
were being used in child trafficking.59 Assessing the Pizzagate events, Caroline
Jack shows that people participate in these sorts of online discussions for a wide
variety of reasons: participation in Pizzagate could have been motivated by
genuine concern about sex trafficking, play, boredom, politics, or any
combination of these.60
Mixed motives also create an administrative problem. Because any single
instance of fake news may have several motivating factors, interventions that
target a single motivating factor—so that only paradigmatic cases of propaganda
or a hoax, for example, are within their scope—may be unsuccessful.61 For
example, a person could produce a fake news story that was motivated by both
financial considerations and political ones. In January 2021, the voting machine
firm Dominion Voting Systems sued Rudy Giuliani, President Trump’s personal
attorney, for defamation based on his claims that the company’s machines were
involved in fraud during the 2020 election.62 Giuliani did so, the firm alleges,
not only to help President Trump, but to increase sales of products he endorses,
such as gold coins and cigars.63 If accurate, this depiction is a classic instance of
mixed motives: Giuliani had both pecuniary and non-pecuniary (political)
reasons for peddling a thoroughly discredited story about election fraud. Even if
financial motivations were the primary purpose for creating the story, the story
might have been produced without the financial incentives if the political
reasons were sufficient on their own. Accordingly, an intervention targeted at
pecuniary motives may not suffice. The problem of multiple sufficient motives
57. See Pamela Paresky, Alex Goldenberg, Denver Riggleman, Jacob N. Shapiro, & John Farmer Jr., How
to Respond to the QAnon Threat, BROOKINGS TECHSTREAM (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/
techstream/how-to-respond-to-the-qanon-threat.
58. Caroline Jack, What’s Propaganda Got to Do With It, DATA & SOC’Y: POINTS (Jan. 5, 2017),
https://points.datasociety.net/whats-propaganda-got-to-do-with-it-5b88d78c3282#.uj7xfxed0.
59. Marc Fisher, John Woodrow Cox, & Peter Hermann, Pizzagate: From Rumor, to Hashtag, to Gunfire
in D.C., WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/pizzagate-from-rumor-to-hashtagto-gunfire-in-dc/2016/12/06/4c7def50-bbd4-11e6-94ac-3d324840106c_story.html.
60. Jack, supra note 58.
61. An example of this would be hoaxes that are exclusively based on financial motivations (for example,
those of the Macedonian teenagers).
62. See Katelyn Polantz, Election Technology Company Dominion Sues Giuliani for $1.3 Billion Over ‘Big
Lie’ About Election Fraud, CNN: POLITICS (Jan. 25, 2021, 9:19 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/25/politics/
dominion-lawsuit-giuliani/index.html.
63. Id.
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shows that although regulating motives may be a tempting starting point, it is
likely an insufficient fix on its own.
C. MIXED INFORMATION (FACT AND FICTION)
The problem of mixed information is that true and false information
coexist, often subtly and intermixed, in fake news and on platforms. Consider
the propaganda narrative about Hillary Clinton’s health during her 2016
presidential campaign.64 This story mixed fact and fiction in a way that made it
hard to fact-check and, by extension, difficult to debunk the claim that Clinton
had serious long-term health issues that made her unfit to be president. It was
true that Clinton had a health problem: she was battling pneumonia.65 It was
false, however, that she had serious long-term health concerns that affected her
fitness for the presidency.66 In particular, propaganda mixes fact and fiction to
create narratives that have staying power because some of the narrative elements
are true, yet the story is presented in a way that is misleading and not true.
Another location for mixing fact and fiction is on platforms themselves,
which may have propaganda interwoven with one-sided news reports. A single
resource may display or blend truth and lies side-by-side. One example of this
phenomenon is the website Breitbart, which, according to Ethan Zuckerman,
“mix[es] propaganda and conspiracy theories with highly partisan news.”67
Breitbart is not alone in this strategy as other similar platforms convincingly
combine propaganda with partisan (yet largely true) news stories. Mixed
information on platforms makes it difficult to discern which stories are partisan
interpretations of actual events and which narratives have moved beyond
reflecting actual events to promote false and misleading accounts.
All of these factors complicate classification of and interventions for fake
news. The next Part uses a four-part taxonomy to classify proffered solutions to
the problem.

III. SOLUTIONS
This Part identifies four ways to shape conduct. It assesses which existing
proposals, if any, are good choices for stemming fake news. This Part adopts
Larry Lessig’s famous formulation of the four modalities that constrain
64. See Tom Kludt, Trump Targets Clinton’s Health in New Ad, CNN: POLITICS (Oct. 11, 2016, 2:10 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/10/11/politics/donald-trump-ad-hillary-clinton-health/index.html.
65. See Jonathan Martin & Amy Chozick, Hillary Clinton’s Doctor Says Pneumonia Led to Abrupt Exit
From 9/11 Event, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/12/us/politics/hillaryclinton-campaign-pneumonia.html.
66. See Tara Golshan, How Hillary Clinton’s Health Passed from an Online Conspiracy Theory to a
Mainstream Debate, VOX (Sept. 13, 2016, 8:13 AM), https://www.vox.com/2016/9/12/12888498/hillaryclinton-health-conspiracy.
67. Ethan Zuckerman, The Case for a Taxpayer-Supported Version of Facebook, THE ATLANTIC: TECH.
(May 7, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/05/the-case-for-a-taxpayer-supportedversion-of-facebook/524037.
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behavior: law (state-sponsored sanctions), markets (price mechanisms),
architecture (such as code), and norms (community standards).68 For example,
one category of fake news—hoaxes—responds particularly well to marketbased constraints. However, as recent research has suggested, and the political
climate of the past four years indicates, this species of fake news may have
minimal impact on the media ecosystem relative to other species; it is
significantly less influential than propaganda.69 In sketching the different modes
of constraining behavior, we assess recent attempts to leverage these techniques
to stem the tide of fake news. We highlight why propaganda—arguably the
biggest problem emanating from fake news—seems to elude all of these
methods.
A. LAW
Law operates through the threat of sanctions from the state.70 It is often the
first response of policymakers to a given challenge. Legal solutions have
practical effect, by punishing and disabling those who violate their commands,
and also suasive impact, by articulating conduct which the polity expressly
disapproves. In theory, law operates equally for all people bound by it, and can
command the entire resources of the state—if necessary—to ensure compliance.
Law, however, is not a perfect mechanism. Some commentators disfavor
state solutions because they are monopolistic and mandatory.71 On this account,
legal restrictions are undesirable because they do not leave room to experiment
with different mechanisms to solve a problem; however, this criticism is largely
true for private solutions by internet platforms as well.72 With high switching
costs due to network effects, Facebook, Google, and other similarly situated
platforms can implement private ordering that is vulnerable to similar criticisms
about the monopolistic effects of regulation.73
68. Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662–63 (1998); see also LESSIG,
supra note 8.
69. Yochai Benkler, Robert Faris, Hal Roberts, & Ethan Zuckerman, Study: Breitbart-led Media Ecosystem
Altered Broader Media Agenda, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Mar. 3, 2017), http://www.cjr.org/analysis/
breitbart-media-trump-harvard-study.php.
70. See Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1985).
71. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207,
215–16 (1996) (arguing “Error in legislation is common, and never more so than when the technology is
galloping forward. Let us not struggle to match an imperfect legal system to an evolving world that we
understand poorly. Let us instead do what is essential to permit the participants in this evolving world to make
their own decisions”).
72. This reasoning is reflected in the idea that states should be “laboratories for democracy,” where
solutions to social issues can be vetted and the best ones identified. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285
U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that “a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country”).
73. Barbara Engels, Data Portability Among Platforms, 5 INTERNET POL’Y REV. 1, 5 (2016),
https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/data-portability-among-online-platforms (discussing the “lock-in
effect” that makes switching costs high when personal data is not portable across platforms). But see Stan J.
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A more trenchant criticism of a legal approach to fake news is that speech
regulations backed by state enforcement are likely to run afoul of the First
Amendment.74 Although there are specific carve-outs for speech that are not
subject to First Amendment protection, criminal and civil lawsuits under these
causes of action are likely to have only a minor effect on the robust fake news
ecosystem.75 One example of speech that is specifically removed from First
Amendment protection is defamation. Defamation—making false statements
about another that damage their reputation—is not protected, and, on the surface,
seems like it could be effectively applied as a cause of action to remedy fake
news.76 However, this may not be effective in clearing up fake news that
references public figures such as politicians or celebrities. For a public figure to
succeed with a defamation claim, that person must prove that the writer or
publisher acted with actual malice (either knowledge of the falsity of the
information or reckless disregard as to falsity), which is exceptionally difficult.77
Even private figures must establish some fault, even if only negligence, on the
part of the defendant in assessing whether information is false.78
Beyond the standard speech-based causes of action, a few commentators
have suggested new legal tools to combat fake news. MSNBC’s chief legal
correspondent has proposed that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulate
fake news under its statutory authority,79 which allows the FTC to police “unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”80 For the FTC to gain
a solid basis for regulation, it would have to make the difficult argument that
fake news is a commercial product even though people are often not paying to
read it.81 David Vladeck, a former director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer
Protection, says that it is unlikely that the FTC could make compelling

Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Are Network Externalities A New Source of Market Failure?, 17 RSCH. L. &
ECON. 1, 12 (1995).
74. See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, What Does the Day After Section 230 Reform Look Like?, BROOKINGS
TECHSTREAM (Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/what-does-the-day-after-section-230reform-look-like (noting that First Amendment constrains Congress’ ability to regulate how platforms manage
content).
75. See U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2014) (listing categories of speech that can be regulated
without triggering First Amendment scrutiny).
76. All Things Considered, What Legal Recourse Do Victims of Fake News Stories Have?, NPR, at 01:04
(Dec. 7, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/12/07/504723649/what-legal-recourse-do-victims-of-fake-newsstories-have.
77. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
78. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (holding “so long as they do not impose
liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher
or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual”).
79. Callum Borchers, How the Federal Trade Commission Could (Maybe) Crack Down on Fake News,
WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/30/how-the-federaltrade-commission-could-maybe-crack-down-on-fake-news/?utm_term=.ce40f260d732.
80. 15 U.S.C § 45(a)(1).
81. Borchers, supra note 79.
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arguments about the commercial nature of fake news, even in paradigmatic cases
like the hoaxes perpetuated by Macedonian teenagers for financial gain.82
A second solution, offered by Professor Noah Feldman, attempts to build
on the defamation exception to First Amendment protection.83 Under this
scheme, Congress would create a private right to delist libelous statements from
the internet.84 To protect people from abusing this removal power, the regime
would require that parties adjudicate whether the statements were false and
defamatory and then have the court direct a removal order to search engines or
other internet platforms.85
There are reasons to think that this solution may unduly threaten speech
that deserves protection. First, as Feldman notes, this would require changing
existing laws that insulate internet publishers from liability arising from hosting
the speech of others.86 The strongest statutory shield from liability for internet
intermediaries is Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which
insulates publishers and distributors from most civil liability for hosting thirdparty content.87 Ironically, this is one of the few issues in technology law upon
which Democrats and Republicans largely agree, although they have critical
differences over how to reform Section 230.88 Laws that protect intermediaries
from liability promote free exchange and robust public debate on the internet.89
The specter of fake news, although a real threat, is not severe enough to merit
stripping protections from internet intermediaries. If anything, removing shields
from liability may be a bigger threat to democratic debate than fake news itself.90
Second, even if Congress stripped liability from speech aggregators, hosts
of third party speech still have First Amendment rights that cannot be abridged
based on a “trial like hearing” where they are not involved.91 Confining judicial
82. Id.
83. Noah Feldman, Opinion, Closing the Safe Harbor for Libelous Fake News, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Dec.
16, 2016, 9:24 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-12-16/free-speech-libel-and-the-truthafter-pizzagate.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 47 U.S.C. § 230.
88. See Jessica Guynn, Biden and Section 230: New Administration, Same Problems for Facebook, Google
and Twitter as Under Trump, USA TODAY (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2021/01/20/
biden-trump-censorship-section-230-google-facebook-scrutiny/4238357001.
89. See Derek E. Bambauer, Against Jawboning, 100 MINN. L. REV. 51, 63 (2015).
90. Revenge porn—and some varieties of cyber harassment—are cases where the threat may be severe
enough to consider imposing liability on parties that are hosts of third-party content. Even then, liability should
be framed as narrowly as possible and not, for example, extend to Google for listing links to revenge porn
websites. See Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 345, 347 (2014). But see Derek E. Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2025, 2055 (2014).
91. Under the prevailing view, search results are protected by the First Amendment. See Eugene Volokh
& Donald M. Falk, First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Results—A White Paper Commissioned by
Google (UCLA Sch. of L., Research Paper No. 12-22, 2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2055364; see also Jane R. Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 60 (2014); Derek E. Bambauer,
Copyright = Speech, 65 EMORY L.J. 199, 201 (2015). But see Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L.
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proceedings to the allegedly defamed party and the original speaker improperly
curtails the First Amendment rights of content hosts, who—like publishers of
traditional media—are entitled to seek to vindicate their rights before having a
court direct removal orders at their platform.92
To sum up, legal solutions are likely to be over-inclusive and threaten
flourishing, robust public debate on the internet to a greater degree than fake
news imperils it. Even if legal solutions seem like an effective tool to combat
fake news, administering new legal remedies will be difficult given the strength
of constitutionally guaranteed speech protections. Finally, propaganda relies on
mixing truth and falsehood to promote a narrative; it is unlikely that legal
solutions, which rely on the ability to prove statements are untrue, will be
effective to restrain the production and dissemination of propaganda.
B. MARKETS
Markets regulate through changes in price that, in turn, determine which
activities and goals people pursue. Market-based solutions can occur naturally
as the result of changes in supply or demand, or they can be intentionally created
when governments intervene in markets to promote or discourage certain
economic activity through subsidies or taxes.93 The underlying logic (or driving
mechanism) of regulation through markets is that people respond to financial
incentives.
In the wake of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Google announced that
it would ban websites that publish fake news articles from using its advertising
platform.94 Google’s decision involved AdSense, which allows websites to
profit from third-party ads hosted on their sites.95 Google’s decision to restrict
access to AdSense undercut the funding model that many fake news sites

REV. 1495, 1496–98 (2013); Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission - Access, Fairness,
and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1152 (2008); James Grimmelmann, Speech
Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868, 912 (2014); Heather M. Whitney & Mark Robert Simpson, Search Engines,
Free Speech Coverage, and the Limits of Analogical Reasoning, in FORTHCOMING FREE SPEECH IN THE
DIGITAL AGE, 1, 14 (Susan J. Brison & Kath Gelber, eds., 2017) (arguing that not all search engine results
should be constitutionally protected).
92. See Brief of Amici Curiae First Amend. and Internet Law Scholars in Support of Appellant, Yelp, Inc.,
at 34, Hassell v. Bird, 247 Cal. App. 4th 1336 (Cal. 2017) (No. S235968), http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?filename=3&article=2463&context=historical&type=additional (claiming that the Court
abridged Yelp’s First Amendment Rights by ordering it to remove content without first providing Yelp an
opportunity to vindicate its rights in court).
93. It is worth noting that government intervention in markets through subsidies and, especially, taxation
has some relevant characteristics of legal regulation, including the threat of sanctions for unpaid taxes. See U.S.
v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 199 (2003) (upholding a statute that required libraries receiving federal
discounts for internet access to install adult content filters on computers).
94. Nick Wingfield, Mike Issac, & Katie Benner, Google and Facebook Take Aim at Fake News Sites,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/technology/google-will-ban-websites-thathost-fake-news-from-using-its-ad-service.html.
95. Id.

838

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:3

leverage to make a profit.96 By removing some financial incentives for fake
news, Google sought to decrease the number of fake news sites.97
Google’s decision to restrict the use of AdSense to exclude sites it deems
fake news—as an instance of regulation through markets—is likely to be both
over-inclusive and under-inclusive. First, as discussed in the section on mixed
intent, determinations at the edges between hoaxes and satire are complicated.98
Many commentators disagree about where satire ends and hoaxes begin.99 For
example, faux CNN publisher Paul Horner has been accused of perpetuating
hoaxes while others see his site as satire.100 It is likely Google’s restriction will
sweep too broadly in at least some cases and chill the production of satire, at
least in the gray areas between the categories. The worry is that short-term
pressure will result in over-inclusive solutions that extend to speech that
deserves protection.
At the same time, Google’s market-based solution is likely to be underinclusive because it does not reach the incentives that power trolling and
propaganda. In the description of this Article’s matrix, we illustrated how
propaganda and trolling101 are strongly motivated by non-financial incentives.
This makes market solutions ineffective at combatting these two species.
Restrictions on AdSense use will only curtail fake news production that has
financial motivations that are sufficient for its production, such as the wholly
economically motivated hoaxes by Macedonian teenagers.
In addition, Yonathan Arbel suggests that “truth bounties” (a market
solution) are a better approach to fake news than expanding existing defamation
laws (a legal solution).102 Truth bounties, according to Arbel, are rewards
offered by journalists and publications to anyone who can prove that a story is
false.103 These rewards are inherently market-based because they create
96. Id.
97. Google’s decision to remove the funding apparatus is not wholly a market-based solution. By all
accounts, Google’s decision was motivated by an attempt to promote good digital citizenship. Google also
appears to be responding to norms about how we want our platforms to operate, or at least, Google was
responding partly to non-market forces. Like motivations and intentions, solutions can be mixed, which further
complicates the discussion.
98. See infra Parts II.A–C.
99. Kyle Wiggers, Researchers Develop AI that Distinguishes Between Satire and Fake News,
VENTUREBEAT (Nov. 5, 2019), https://venturebeat.com/2019/11/05/researchers-develop-ai-that-distinguishesbetween-satire-and-fake-news.
100. Robert G. Parkinson, Fake News? That’s a Very Old Story, WASH. POST. (Nov. 5, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fake-news-thats-a-very-old-story/2016/11/25/c8b1f3d4-b330-11e68616-52b15787add0_story.html.
101. The question of whether to regulate trolling and propaganda is a separate issue. Trolling may have
defenders, but propaganda seems—almost by definition—like something society wants to reduce. See John
Maxwell Hamilton & Kevin R. Kosar, Call It What It Is: Propaganda, POLITICO (Oct. 8, 2020),
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/10/08/government-communication-propaganda-427290.
102. Yonathan Arbel, Slicing Defamation by Contract, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (2020),
https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/03/30/slicing-defamation-by-contract-by-yonathan-arbel.
103. Id.
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additional financial incentives to produce truthful reporting. Of course, truth
bounties are not required by law; however, Arbel claims that many publications
will opt into this system because of the signaling effects of truth bounties.104
That is, publications that do not offer rewards for falsification are potentially
indicating lower quality information and, by extension, may be viewed more
skeptically by the general public.105
While Arbel’s truth bounties are innovative and potentially useful, they do
not appear to remedy the full spectrum of fake news. Truth bounties may be
effective against hoaxes where the information contained in the story is provably
false. However, in order for truth bounties to combat hoaxes, publishers of hoax
websites would have to offer rewards for falsification, which seems unlikely.
Still, the absence of truth bounties on hoax websites may offer additional
information that alerts potentially duped readers that the information may not be
credible. Truth bounties offer less purchase to remedy the effects of propaganda.
This is largely because propaganda exists in a grey area of truthfulness that
makes it exceedingly difficult (if not impossible) to debunk. Propagandists can
present factual information in a way that encourages readers to draw
unwarranted conclusions, as was the case in many of the stories about Hillary
Clinton’s health issues.106 Even though truth bounties cannot resolve all issues
of fake news, they represent an imaginative solution that may restore trust in
some historically respected publications, as stalwarts like the New York Times
would offer significant rewards for falsification of their stories.
Taken together, market solutions are only marginally effective. They are
better situated to respond to hoaxes where the incentives of production are
primarily financial and the content is decisively false. However, tinkering with
the financial incentives of information production will offer little protection
against trolling and propaganda where the incentives for creating these stories
are largely non-monetary.
C. ARCHITECTURE/CODE
Architecture (code, in the internet context) constrains through the physical
(or digital) realities of the environment. This includes both built and found
features of the world. “That I cannot see through walls is a constraint on my
ability to snoop. That I cannot read your mind is a constraint on my ability to
know whether you are telling me the truth.”107 Thus, Larry Lessig provides

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Lisa Lerer, No, Hillary Clinton Is Not Having a Seizure in That Video, Says AP Reporter Who Was
There, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 12, 2016, 7:40 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-hillaryclinton-health-20160812-story.html.
107. Lessig, supra note 68, at 663.
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examples of built (walls) and found (laws of nature) realities that regulate our
actions.108
Under Lessig’s view, the contingency of the digital environment can either
promote or obstruct certain values.109 Because code is always built and never
found, it provides its creators with an opportunity to structure an environment
that promotes certain values (such as privacy, free expression, etc.).110 Similarly,
because the digital environment is subject to change, corporate or national
interests could co-opt its workings to suppress or alter these values.111 Thus, the
technological determination thesis of the internet—that it must promote these
positive values—is both untrue and dangerous, because it lulls digital
communities into believing that the capacity for free expression is an inherent
feature of the internet.112
The structure of Facebook’s Timeline section demonstrates how behavior
can be constrained through architecture. With limited space in the section,
selection mechanisms that promote certain stories at the expense of others play
a significant role in determining what gets read and shared in Facebook’s digital
environment. Included stories are likely to receive more attention than excluded
ones. Facebook determines the “rules of the game” by deciding which stories
are selected to appear, and Facebook’s use of both human and algorithmic
selection mechanisms is contentious.113 When only humans determined which
news stories were appropriate for inclusion, there were concerns about bias. For
example, a Gizmodo report alleged that Facebook’s curators frequently
suppressed politically conservative perspectives.114 In response, the U.S. Senate
Commerce Committee launched an inquiry—spearheaded by Republican
Senator John Thune—into Facebook’s processes, including whether
conservative stories were intentionally suppressed or more liberal stories were
intentionally added into the section.115 This concern has hardened into a nearlyubiquitous belief in bias among Republicans.116

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. The contingency of free expression on the internet is much more apparent now than it was when Lessig
first published CODE in 1998. See EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION 263 (1st ed., 2012).
113. Nick Hopkins, Revealed: Facebook’s Internal Rulebook on Sex, Terrorism and Violence, THE
GUARDIAN (May 21, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/may/21/revealed-facebook-internalrulebook-sex-terrorism-violence.
114. Michael Nunez, Senate GOP Launches Inquiry into Facebook’s News Curation, GIZMODO (May 10,
2016), http://gizmodo.com/senate-gop-launches-inquiry-into-facebook-s-news-curati-1775767018.
115. Id.
116. See David French, The Right’s Message to Silicon Valley: ‘Free Speech for Me, but Not for Thee’,
TIME (Jan. 16, 2021), https://time.com/5930281/right-wing-silicon-valley-free-speech; Cecilia Kang & David
McCabe, Big Tech Was Their Enemy, Until Partisanship Fractured the Battle Plans, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/06/technology/lawmakers-big-tech-power-bipartisan.html.
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Partially in response to these concerns about bias, Facebook altered its
selection process to be more automated and require fewer human decisions.117
However, with the reduced role of human editors, hoaxes on Facebook
flourished.118 A fake news story showing that anchor Megyn Kelly supported
Hillary Clinton went viral and caused her to be fired from Fox News.119
Facebook’s architecture is optimized for stories that are likely to produce clicks
and shares.120 Fake news is likely to cause users to distribute its content, often
by confirming biases, which in turn makes it proliferate through Facebook’s
news ecosystem.121
Distinguishing between satire and more pernicious forms of fake news
requires human judgment (at least with the current state of algorithmic
capability). Architecture alone is not up to the task of providing useful
distinctions between satire and hoaxes, nor is it an effective remedy for
propaganda. If anything, the current architecture of social networking platforms
favors the spread of fake news instead of limiting it. Again, this is largely a
consequence of Facebook and other social networking sites optimizing their
algorithms to display stories that users are likely to share.122 Fake news stories
are often popular, in part by being inflammatory or catering to pre-existing
viewpoints.123 When this happens, users are likely to share the fake news story
within their networks. Code alone may thus worsen the problem instead of
ameliorating it.
D. NORMS
Social norms constrain behavior by pressuring individuals to conform to
certain standards and practices of conduct.124 They structure how we
communicate with each other and seem to be a useful starting point for informal
regulation of fake news. For instance, Seana Shiffrin advocates for a norm of
sincerity to govern our speech with others.125 Interestingly, Shiffrin claims that
this “duty of sincerity” arises from the opacity of other people’s minds and our
moral need to understand each other.126 This maps nicely to the primary problem
117. See French, supra note 116; Kang & McCabe, supra note 116; see also Search FYI: An Update to
Trending, FACEBOOK (Oct. 16, 2016), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/08/search-fyi-an-update-totrending.
118. See Caplan, supra note 26.
119. Id.
120. See Frischmann & Selinger, supra note 54.
121. Id.
122. See Brett Frischmann & Mark Verstraete, We Need Our Platforms to Put People and Democratic
Society Ahead of Cheap Profits, RECODE (June 16, 2017), https://www.recode.net/2017/6/16/15763388/
facebook-fake-news-propaganda-federated-social-network-bbc-trus-surveillance-capitalism.
123. Id.
124. ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991); see also Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal
System, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
125. SEANA SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 184 (2014).
126. Id.
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that plagues the classification of fake news—mainly, that mental content is
private. This analytical similarity makes inculcating norms of sincerity a good
starting point for stemming fake news that we find harmful; however, it has
complications of its own.
First, norms arise organically and are usually not the result of design and
planning.127 Unlike legal rules, it is hard, and maybe impossible, to summon
them out of nothing. It is one thing to say that we ought to have certain norms
and quite another to bring the desired norms into practice.128 This is a practical
limitation on implementing norms to govern behavior.
Second, norms are often nebulous and diverse. When it comes to
limitations on speech, the conventional wisdom—and what is constitutionally
required when the government regulates speech—is to tie the regulation to a
concrete harm as closely as possible.129 The fear is that regulation will intrude
on fundamental values and chill free expression. Similarly, because norms are
nebulous, a norm of sincerity would likely pick out all of our species of fake
news (even The Onion, which is the paradigmatic case of satire and thus worthy
of protection). Finally, as some commentators have noted, norms may be harder
to enforce online.130

IV. A WAY FORWARD
Fake news is a complex phenomenon that resists simple or quick solutions.
Any intervention must strike a delicate balance by offering a sufficiently robust
response to fake news while also not causing more harm than the inaccurate
information does. In this Part, we offer potential models for such interventions,
while acknowledging that each proposal is likely to solve only a segment of the
problem. Rather than endorsing any of these models—or even suggesting that
they be adopted as a package—we intend the proposals to generate debate and
dialogue about how solutions ought to be structured and about the trade-offs they
will produce. We organize these model interventions based on Lessig’s four
modalities, as we did earlier in categorizing fake news.

127. Cristina Bicchieri & Ryan Muldoon, Social Norms, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(2011), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-norms.
128. This challenge was central to the difficulties of combating copyright infringement over peer-to-peer
networks. See generally Yuval Feldman & Janice Nadler, The Law and Norms of File Sharing, 43 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 577 (2006).
129. This is the structure of strict scrutiny analysis for speech. See Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S.
786, 799 (2011) (noting when a law “imposes a restriction on the content of protected speech, it is invalid unless
[the government] can demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny—that is, unless it is justified by a compelling
government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest”).
130. See, e.g., Jessa Lingel & danah boyd, “Keep it Secret, Keep it Safe”: Information Poverty, Information
Norms, and Stigma, 64 J. AM. SOC’Y INFO. SCI. & TECH. 981 (2013).
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A. LAW
Legal interventions for fake news are limited by law itself in two ways: As
a matter of First Amendment doctrine and as a matter of federal statute. Liability
for creating or distributing fake news is constrained by the Constitution—
political speech is at the heart of First Amendment protection,131 and the
Supreme Court has recently applied more searching scrutiny, as a practical
matter, to commercial speech as well.132 Even openly false political content is
heavily protected.133 Similarly, federal statutes such as Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act134 and Title II of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act135 limit liability for publishers and distributors (though not
authors) of tortious or copyright-infringing material. Moreover, augmenting
liability for fake news is not likely to be effective. Platforms face a daunting task
in policing the flood of information posted to their servers each day,136 and a
sizable judgment can be fatal to a site.137 Most authors are judgment-proof—
unable to pay damages in any meaningful amount—and may be difficult to
identify or be beyond the reach of U.S. courts. Overall, there is a consensus in
the United States that the internet information ecosystem is best served by
limiting liability, not increasing it.138
However, this consensus does highlight one useful change that the law
could make to combat fake news. The immunity conferred under Section 230
was intended to create incentives for intermediaries to police problematic
content on their platforms, without fear of triggering liability for performing this
gatekeeping function.139 In recent years, though, a series of decisions have
chipped away at Section 230’s immunity, creating both risk and uncertainty for

131. See U.S. v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 711 (2012).
132. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health, 564 U.S. 552, 572 (2011) (prescription information); Matal v. Tam,
137 S.Ct. 1744, 1767 (2017) (trademarks); Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S.Ct. 1144, 1150
(2017) (credit card surcharge statements); see generally Jane R. Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer, Information
Libertarianism, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 335 (2017).
133. See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 709.
134. 47 U.S.C. § 230.
135. 17 U.S.C. § 512.
136. See generally H. Brian Holland, In Defense of Online Intermediary Immunity: Facilitating
Communities of Modified Exceptionalism, 56 KAN. L. REV. 369 (2008); David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or
Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373 (2010).
137. See Sydney Ember, Gawker, Filing for Bankruptcy After Hulk Hogan Suit, is for Sale, N.Y. TIMES
(June 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/11/business/media/gawker-bankruptcy-sale.html.
138. See generally Eric Goldman, Online User Account Termination and 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2), 2 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 659 (2012). There may be harms that justify curtailing Section 230’s immunity from liability,
but fake news does not yet rise to that level. See generally Danielle Citron, Revenge Porn and the Uphill Battle
to Pierce Section 230 Immunity (Part II), CONCURRING OPINIONS (Jan. 25, 2013),
https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/01/revenge-porn-and-the-uphill-battle-to-pierce-section-230immunity-part-ii.html.
139. See Zeran v. Am. Online, 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
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platforms.140 Statutory reform could fill the cracks in Section 230 immunity,
reducing both risk and cost for platforms. As cases such as the lawsuits against
the websites Ripoff Report141 and Yelp!142 show, internet firms may face legal
risks from hosting both truthful and allegedly false information. Increased
immunity would enable platforms to filter information with confidence that their
decisions would not open them up to lawsuits and damages.
In particular, Congress could consider three specific textual changes to
Section 230. The first would change section 230(e)(3) to read: “No cause of
action may be brought, and no liability may be imposed, under any state or local
law that is inconsistent with this section. A court shall dismiss any such cause of
action or suit with prejudice when it is filed, or upon motion of any party to such
cause of action or suit” (change italicized).143 This would authorize—and indeed
require—courts to dismiss lawsuits that run counter to Section 230 immunity on
their own authority, without requiring defendants to answer a complaint or incur
litigation costs. In addition, the change emphasizes that the focus is on laws that
are inconsistent with Section 230, rather than implicitly encouraging courts to
search for ways of making them consistent.
Second, Congress could reduce the ability to bypass Section 230 immunity
through exploiting the exception for intellectual property (IP) claims. It is easy
for creative plaintiffs’ attorneys to re-characterize tort causes of action—which
should be pre-empted by Section 230 immunity—as IP ones, which are not preempted in most circuits.144 For example, a defamation claim can be readily recast as one for infringement of the plaintiff’s right of publicity; in most states,
the right of publicity is treated as an IP right that protects against the use of one’s
name or likeness for commercial or financial gain.145 Congress could change
section 230(e)(2) to only allow suits based on federal IP laws to circumvent
immunity by altering the text to read: “Nothing in this section shall be construed
to limit or expand any law pertaining to federal intellectual property” (change

140. See Eric Goldman, Ten Worst Section 230 Rulings of 2016 (Plus the Five Best), TECH. & MKTG. L.
BLOG (Jan. 4, 2017), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/01/ten-worst-section-230-rulings-of-2016plus-the-five-best.htm; Eric Goldman, The Regulation of Reputational Information, in THE NEXT DIGITAL
DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 293 (Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus eds., 2010).
141. See Vision Sec. v. Xcentric Ventures, No. 2:13-cv-00926-CW-BCW (D. Utah Aug. 27, 2015),
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2036&context=historical.
142. See Tim Cushing, California Appeals Court Reaffirms Section 230 Protections in Lawsuit Against Yelp
for Third-Party Postings, TECHDIRT (July 19, 2016), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20160716/
14115134996/california-appeals-court-reaffirms-section-230-protections-lawsuit-against-yelp-third-partypostings.shtml.
143. The italics indicate added text. The change would also delete the first sentence of § 230(e)(3) and add
two commas to what is currently the second sentence.
144. Compare Perfect 10 v. CCBill, 488 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2007) (pre-empting state IP claims under
Section 230), with Universal Commc’ns Sys. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418 (1st Cir. 2007) (permitting state
IP claims under Section 230).
145. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (2019).
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italicized). While the proposed change does not completely foreclose creative
pleading, it reduces its scope by removing claims based in state law.
Finally, Congress could reverse the most pliable and pernicious exception
to Section 230 immunity, where courts hold defendants liable for being
“responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
information.”146 Courts have used the concept of being partly responsible for the
creation or development of information to hold platforms liable for activities
such as structuring the entry of user-generated information147 or even focusing
on a particular type of information.148 Logically, a platform is always partly
responsible for the creation or development of information—it provides the
forum by which content is generated and disseminated. And, platforms
inherently make decisions to prioritize certain content, and to create incentives
to spread it across the network, such as where Facebook’s algorithms accentuate
information that is likely to produce user engagement. If that activity vitiated
Section 230 immunity, though, it would wipe out the statute.
A strong version of statutory reform would change section 230(f)(3) to
read: “The term ‘information content provider’ means the person or entity that
is wholly responsible for the creation or development of information provided
through the Internet or any other interactive computer service” (change
italicized). If this alteration seems to risk allowing the actual authors or creators
of fake news to escape liability by arguing they were not entirely responsible for
its generation, Congress could adopt a more limited reform by changing the
statutory text to read: “The term ‘information content provider’ means any
person or entity that is chiefly responsible for the creation or development of
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer
service” (change italicized). This would assign liability only to the entity most
responsible for the generation of the information at issue.
These proposed reforms to Section 230 immunity would harness law to
reduce legal liability for internet platforms and to encourage intermediaries to
filter fake news without risk of lawsuits or damages.
B. MARKETS
Market-based solutions provide an appealing starting point for managing
fake news. One species of fake news—hoaxes—responds particularly well to
altering the economic structure that drives their production. Many creators of
hoaxes are driven mainly (or solely) by the potential profit that these fake news
stories can provide. Because of this, interventions that change the profitability
of fake news should result in the production of fewer hoaxes.
146. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
147. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th
Cir. 2008).
148. See, e.g., NPS LLC v. StubHub, 25 Mass. Law Rep. 478, 480 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 2006).
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However, only addressing the economic incentives that attend the creation
of hoaxes is an incomplete reaction. First, other types of fake news are not as
responsive to economic incentives. For instance, propaganda is driven primarily
by non-financial motivations, so solutions that only change pecuniary incentive
structures are unlikely to alter the production of propaganda. Second, authors
are not the only entities motivated by economic factors to produce fake news—
platforms are also optimized to spread fake news for financial gain. Addressing
the economic incentives of social media platforms requires different market
interventions than those directed towards the creators of hoaxes.
Some fake news may be a symptom of surveillance capitalism, the
economic model underlying many internet platforms that monetizes collecting
data and using it to effectively serve advertisements.149 In this sense, fake
news—and other stories that play to our cognitive biases to harvest clicks—are
key to Facebook’s business model because this information increases user
activity, which, in turn, allows Facebook to more effectively tailor its
advertisements. Understanding fake news as a symptom of these deeper
structural issues requires that solutions introduce an entirely new incentive
structure to digital platforms.
Recognition of the economic incentives that underlie proprietary social
networking sites has spurred other attempts to create non-market alternatives.
Federated social networks such as diaspora* were introduced as an alternative
to Facebook and other proprietary platforms.150 These social networking
arrangements offered the possibility of protecting user privacy because their
business model did not require widespread collection of user data.151 Similarly,
social networks that do not rely on collecting user data would potentially limit
the spread of hoaxes that generate user engagement and increase platform
profitability. However, these networks have yet to achieve success, in terms of
user base or funding, that even begins to compete with sites such as Facebook.152

149. Evgeny Morozov, Moral Panic Over Fake News Hides the Real Enemy - The Digital Giants, THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 7, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jan/08/blaming-fake-news-notthe-answer-democracy-crisis; see also Frischmann & Selinger, Why It’s Dangerous to Outsource Our Critical
Thinking to Computs., THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/10/
google-facebook-critical-thinking-computers.
150. See Welcome to Diaspora*, DIASPORA* FOUND., https://diasporafoundation.org (last visited Mar. 21,
2022).
151. Christopher Shea, Is a Social Network that Doesn’t Share User Data Possible? We Asked Someone
Who’s Trying, VOX (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.vox.com/conversations/2018/3/27/17168790/ello-facebookalternative-data-privacy-cambridge-analytica-deletefacebook.
152. See Will Oremus, The Search for the Anti-Facebook, SLATE (Oct. 28, 2014),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/10/ello_diaspora_and_the_anti_facebook_why_alt
ernative_social_networks_can.html; JIM DWYER, MORE AWESOME THAN MONEY: FOUR BOYS AND THEIR
HEROIC QUEST TO SAVE YOUR PRIVACY FROM FACEBOOK (2014).
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Still, non-market-based social networking alternatives may not limit the
creation and spread of propaganda.153 One way forward would be for a trusted
media entity—like the British Broadcasting Company (BBC)—to create a social
networking platform that is not financed through advertising and that leverages
its media expertise to make judgments about news content.154 This strategy has
at least two benefits.
First, while the non-commercial funding model creates a remedy for
hoaxes, it is worth noting that the BBC is not funded by the U.K. government,
but is instead funded through private licenses paid by every household that
watches any live television.155 This funding structure insulates the BBC from
being pressured into promoting the government’s narrative, although it is
ultimately dependent upon enforcement by the government. This license model
also insulates a potential social networking platform from the economic
incentives that force Facebook to select for hoaxes and other fake news in order
to increase profitability.
Second, the BBC can provide a remedy to non-financially motivated fake
news (specifically propaganda). The BBC has an elite staff of editors and
journalists who can make difficult editorial judgments about propaganda.
Editors have the requisite expertise to determine if a narrative is baseless and is
promulgated simply to manipulate people.156 Although there are many details to
work out with this new model, it provides a remedy to both financially and nonfinancially motivated fake news.
However, this potential solution has limitations. Like federated social
networks, a BBC social networking platform may fail to draw a critical mass of
users. Social networks are governed by network effects, which make platforms
with a large user base more desirable than platforms with very few users.157 It
may be difficult to entice people to switch away from Facebook when all their

153. For example, ISIS has used the diaspora* network to spread propaganda after being forced off Twitter.
Islamic State Shifts to New Platforms After Twitter Block, BBC NEWS (Aug. 21, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28843350. The network’s decentralized architecture has made its
organizers unable to respond effectively or to remove the ISIS content. Islamic State Fighters on Diaspora*,
DIASPORA* FOUND.: BLOG (Aug. 20, 2014), https://blog.diasporafoundation.org/4-islamic-state-fighters-ondiaspora.
154. Brett Frischmann, Understanding the Role of the BBC as a Provider of Public Infrastructure (Cardozo
Legal Studs. Research Paper No. 507, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2897777
(calling for the BBC to consider creating a social media network); see Frischmann & Verstraete, supra note 122.
155. See The Licence Fee, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/aboutthebbc/governance/licencefee (last visited Mar.
21, 2022).
156. Andrew M. Guess, Michael Lerner, Benjamin Lyons, Jacob M. Montgomery, Brendan Nyhan, Jason
Reifler & Neelanjan Sircir, A Digital Media Literacy Intervention Decreases Discernment Between Mainstream
and False News in the United States and India, 117 PROC. NAT. ACAD. SCI. 15536, 15536 (2020) (noting that
social media lacks traditional editorial controls).
157. Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L.
REV. 479, 483–85 (1998) (explaining network effects).
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friends and family still use it.158 Implementation of the license model may
require government action to enforce any requirement to purchase licenses.
Management of the license fee mechanism could be costly.159 Finally, imposing
the cost of licenses on users may be unpopular, especially when Facebook is
free.
C. ARCHITECTURE/CODE
Code-based interventions seem to hold considerable promise for managing
fake news.160 The internet platforms that are the principal distribution
mechanisms for this information run on code: it defines what is permitted or
forbidden, what is given prominence, and what (if anything) is escalated for
review by human editors. While software code requires an initial investment in
development and debugging, it is nearly costless to deploy afterwards. Code runs
automatically and constantly. More sophisticated algorithms may be capable of
a form of learning over time, enabling them to improve their accuracy.161
However, code also has drawbacks. At present, even sophisticated
programs have trouble parsing human language. Software is challenged by
nuance and context—a fake news item and a genuine report are likely to have
similar terms, but vastly different meanings.162 Code will inevitably make
mistakes, classifying real news as fake, and vice versa. Inevitably, software
programs have bugs, and humans will try to take advantage of them.
Nonetheless, code-based solutions have potential to reduce the effects of
fake news. It is unsurprising that a number of internet platforms have begun
testing software-based interventions. Twitter has developed a prototype feature
for crowd-sourcing the identification of fake news; users would be able to single
out tweets with false or misleading information for review or, potentially, delisting.163 The company is already attempting to identify characteristics that
indicate a Tweet is fake news, including via algorithms and associations with
158. Some commentators have tried to solve some problems of network effects by introducing various types
of data portability. See Gabriel Nicholas, Taking it With You: Platform Barriers to Entry and the Limits of Data
Portability, 27 MICH. TECH. L. REV. 263 (2021).
159. Jim Waterson, How is the BBC Funded and Could the Licence Fee Be Abolished?, THE GUARDIAN
(Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2019/dec/16/qa-how-the-bbc-is-funded-by-tv-licences
(describing how the UK enforces the license requirement for the BBC).
160. Kyle Wiggers, Microsoft Claims its AI Framework Spots Fake News Better than State-of-the-Art
Vaselines, VENTUREBEAT (Apr. 7, 2020), https://venturebeat.com/2020/04/07/microsoft-ai-fake-news-betterthan-state-of-the-art-baselines. But see Samuel Wooley, We’re Fighting Fake News AI Bots by Using More AI.
That’s a Mistake, MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/01/08/130983/
were-fighting-fake-news-ai-bots-by-using-more-ai-thats-a-mistake.
161. Karen Hao, What Is Machine Learning?, MIT TECH REV. (Nov. 17, 2018),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/11/17/103781/what-is-machine-learning-we-drew-you-anotherflowchart.
162. Wiggers, supra note 99.
163. Elisabeth Dwoskin, Twitter is Looking for Ways to Let Users Flag Fake News, Offensive Content,
WASH. POST (June 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/06/29/twitter-islooking-for-ways-to-let-users-flag-fake-news.
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known reliable (or unreliable) sources.164 Facebook has moved to tag posts as
fake news, relying on users to identify suspect posts and independent monitors
to make a final determination.165 The social network may reduce the visibility
of fake news stories in users’ feeds based on these judgments.166 However,
critics have challenged Facebook’s efforts as ineffective, if not
counterproductive.167 Google has redesigned its News page to include additional
fact-checking information from third-party sites,168 which it also includes
alongside its search results.169 And Google users can flag Autocomplete
suggestions or the search engine’s “Featured Snippets” as fake news.170
Thus far, platforms have attempted to contextualize fake news by
generating additional relevant information using algorithms, but other codebased responses are also possible. For example, firms could employ user
feedback in determining where information appears in one’s Twitter timeline or
Facebook News Feed—or, indeed, if it appears there at all. The tech news site
Slashdot enables selected users to moderate comments by designating them as
good or bad; this scoring increases or decreases the visibility of the comments.171
Similarly, platforms could identify and remove, known fake news items or
sources by “fingerprinting” them or by evaluating them using algorithms.172
While this intervention requires subjective determinations by internet
companies, most already censor some information: Facebook does not permit

164. Id.
165. How is Facebook Addressing False Information Through Independent Fact-Checkers?, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/733019746855448 (last visited Mar. 21, 2022); Amber Jamieson & Olivia
Solon, Facebook to Begin Flagging Fake News in Response to Mounting Criticism, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 15,
2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/15/facebook-flag-fake-news-fact-check.
166. FACEBOOK, supra note 165.
167. Sam Levin, Facebook Promised to Tackle Fake News. But the Evidence Shows It’s Not Working, THE
GUARDIAN (May 16, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/16/facebook-fake-news-toolsnot-working.
168. Joseph Lichterman, Google News Launches a Streamlined Redesign That Gives More Prominence to
Fact Checking, NIEMANLAB (June 27, 2017), http://www.niemanlab.org/2017/06/google-news-launches-astreamlined-redesign-that-gives-more-prominence-to-fact-checking.
169. April Glaser, Google is Rolling Out a Fact-Check Feature in its Search and News Results, VOX (Apr.
8, 2017), https://www.vox.com/2017/4/8/15229878/google-fact-check-fake-news-search-news-results.
170. Hayley Tsukayama, Google’s Asking You for Some Help to Fix its ‘Fake News’ Problem, WASH. POST
(Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/04/25/googles-asking-you-forsome-help-to-fix-its-fake-news-problem.
171. CmdrTaco, Slashdot Moderation, SLASHDOT, https://slashdot.org/moderation.shtml (last visited Mar.
21, 2022).
172. For example, Google uses its Content ID system to scan videos uploaded to YouTube to identify
material that may infringe copyright. How Content ID Works, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/
answer/2797370?hl=en (last visited Mar. 21, 2022).
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nudity;173 Google removes child pornography174 and certain information that
violates individual privacy rights;175 Twitter has moved to purge hate speech.176
Since they already curate information, sites could reward or penalize users based
on the content they post: people who post genuine news could gain greater
visibility for their information or functionality for their accounts, while those
who consistently disseminate fake news might be banned altogether. Finally,
platforms might make some initial, broad-based distinctions based upon the
source of the information: the New York Times (as genuine news) and The Onion
(as satire) could be whitelisted, while InfoWars and Natural News (as fake news)
could be blacklisted. This would leave substantial amounts of information for
further analysis, but could at least use code to process easy cases.
Code-based solutions have limitations but show promise as part of a
strategy to address fake news.
D. NORMS
Norms are a potent regulatory tool: they are virtually costless to regulators
once created, enjoy distributed enforcement through social mechanisms, and
may be internalized by their targets for self-enforcement. Yet these same
characteristics make them difficult to wield. It is challenging to create, shift, or
inculcate norms—campaigns against smoking worked well,177 while ones
against copyright infringement and unauthorized downloading were utter
failures.178 Changes in norms are unpredictable, as are the interactions between
norms and other regulatory modalities. Part of the move by platforms such as
Google and Facebook to engage in greater fact-checking of news stories relies
upon norms—if users do not internalize the norm of verifying information, then
these efforts will come to naught. And, these efforts must reckon with the reality
that fake news is popular for some viewers, particularly when it has the effect of
confirming their pre-existing beliefs or prior information.179 The norm of fact173. See Julia Angwin & Hannes Grassegger, Facebook’s Secret Censorship Rules Protect White Men from
Hate Speech but Not Black Children, PROPUBLICA (June 28, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/
facebook-hate-speech-censorship-internal-documents-algorithms.
174. Robinson Meyer, The Tradeoffs in Google’s New Crackdown on Child Pornography, THE ATLANTIC
(Nov. 18, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/11/the-tradeoffs-in-googles-newcrackdown-on-child-pornography/281604.
175. Removal Policies, GOOGLE SEARCH HELP, https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/
2744324?hl=en (last visited Mar. 21, 2022).
176. Twitter Takes New Steps to Curb Abuse, Hate Speech, CBS NEWS (Feb. 7, 2017),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/twitter-crack-down-on-abuse-hate-speech.
177. See, e.g., Benjamin Alamar & Stanton A. Glantz, Effect of Increased Social Unacceptability of
Cigarette Smoking on Reduction in Cigarette Consumption, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1359 (2006).
178. See John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH L.
REV. 537, 539 (2007); Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some Observations on
the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 167, 171 (2002).
179. See Gordon Pennycook, Tyrone D. Cannon & David G. Rand, Prior Exposure Increases Perceived
Accuracy of Fake News, 147 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: GEN. 1865 (2018).
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checking comes into conflict with the psychological tendency to validate
confirmatory information and to discount contrarian views.180 In addition, factchecking may be irrelevant for people for whom false information serves as a
key part of their identity and group affiliations.181 Thus, while the prospect of
acting as a norm entrepreneur to combat fake news is an appealing one, its
likelihood of success is uncertain.182
One norm-based intervention would be for platforms to use their own
reputation and credibility to combat fake news. At present, entities such as
Google and Facebook outsource the role of contextualizing or disputing false
information to other entities such as Snopes or the Associated Press.183 Tagging
stories as “disputed” or displaying alternative explanations alongside them is
implicitly a form of commentary by the platform. However, it is one that largely
masks the intermediary’s role, particularly since the countervailing information
comes under a different brand and because Google, among others, tries to
portray its search results as organic, rather than artificially constructed.184 And,
research suggests that flagging only a subset of questionable pieces of
information as suspect increases readers’ confidence in the remaining data.185
Platforms could, though, be more direct and explicit in taking positions
about fake news stories.186 The internet scholar Evgeny Morozov offers one
potential model.187 In 2012, he urged Google to take a more overt role in
opposing discredited theories such as those promulgated by the anti-vaccine
movement and 9/11 conspiracy theory adherents.188 Morozov’s proposal is not
180. See David Braucher, Fake News: Why We Fall for It, PSYCH. TODAY (Dec. 28, 2016),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/contemporary-psychoanalysis-in-action/201612/fake-news-why-wefall-it; Elizabeth Kolbert, Why Facts Don’t Change Our Minds, NEW YORKER (Feb. 19, 2017),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/02/27/why-facts-dont-change-our-minds.
181. See Dan M. Kahan, Misconceptions, Misinformation, and the Logic of Identity-Protective Cognition 4
(The Cultural Cognition Project, Working Paper No. 164, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2973067.
182. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
183. Daniel Funke, The AP Isn’t Abandoning its Fact-Checking Partnership with Facebook. It’s Expanding
It, POYNTER (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/2019/the-ap-isnt-abandoning-its-factchecking-partnership-with-facebook-its-expanding-it.
184. See generally Dave Davies, The Death of Organic Search (As We Know It), SEARCH ENGINE J. (Mar.
29, 2017), https://www.searchenginejournal.com/death-organic-search-know/189625.
185. See Gordon Pennycook, Adam Bear, Evan T. Collins, & David G. Rand, The Implied Truth Effect:
Attaching Warnings to a Subset of Fake News Headlines Increases Perceived Accuracy of Headlines Without
Warnings, 66 MGMT. SCI. 4944, 4948 (2020). But see Antino Kim, Patricia L. Moravec, & Alan R. Dennis,
Combating Fake News on Social Media with Source Ratings: The Effects of User and Expert Reputation Ratings,
36 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 931 (2019) (finding that applying ratings to a subset of articles increased skepticism
about unrated ones).
186. Facebook does take a direct role in deciding what content to permit in its News Feeds, or to remove
from them, following a complicated model that permits critiques of groups but not of sub-groups. However, the
site’s criteria are hardly explicit or transparent. See Angwin & Grassegger, supra note 173.
187. Evgeny Morozov, Warning: This Site Contains Conspiracy Theories, SLATE (Jan. 23, 2012),
https://slate.com/technology/2012/01/anti-vaccine-activists-9-11-deniers-and-googles-social-search.html.
188. Id.
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censorship: he does not advocate altering search results or removing fake news.
Rather, he wants platforms to alert their users that they are at risk of consuming
false information, and to provide them with an alternative path to knowledge
that has been verified as accurate.189 He suggests that “whenever users are
presented with search results that are likely to send them to sites run by
pseudoscientists or conspiracy theorists, Google may simply display a huge red
banner asking users to exercise caution and check a previously generated list of
authoritative resources before making up their minds.”190 Morozov notes that
Google already intervenes in similar fashion for users in some countries when
they search for information about suicide or similar self-harm.191 And, Google
famously added a disclaimer to its search results when the top site corresponding
to a search for “Jew” was that of a neo-Nazi group.192 Similarly, the firm
changed its autocomplete suggestions for searches when they included offensive
assertions about Jews, Muslims, and women.193 By extending Morozov’s model,
platforms could counter fake news stories and results by explicitly dissociating
their companies from them and by offering alternative information on their own
account, under the companies’ brands.194 Users might well pay more attention
to an express statement of disavowal by Facebook than they would to analysis
by an unrelated third party such as the Associated Press. In effect, platforms
would leverage their credibility against fake news.
This proposal has drawbacks.195 First, it requires platforms to explicitly
take a position on particular fake news stories, which they have been reluctant
to do even in clear cases.196 When fake news is popular, opposing it may make
platforms unpopular, which is a difficult undertaking for publicly-traded
companies in a competitive market. Second, it functions best (and perhaps only)

189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id; see also Helping You Find Emergency Information When You Need It, GOOGLE: BLOG (Nov. 11,
2010), https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/helping-you-find-emergency-information.html.
192. See Danny Sullivan, Google In Controversy Over Top-Ranking for Anti-Jewish Site, SEARCH ENGINE
WATCH (Apr. 24, 2004), https://searchenginewatch.com/sew/news/2065217/google-in-controversy-over-topranking-for-anti-jewish-site.
193. Samuel Gibbs, Google Alters Search Autocomplete to Remove ‘Are Jews Evil’ Suggestion, THE
GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/05/google-alterssearch-autocomplete-remove-are-jews-evil-suggestion.
194. Danny Sullivan offered a similar suggestion to counteract, or at least contextualize, the results obtained
when one searches for the term “Santorum” on Bing. Danny Sullivan, Why Does Microsoft’s Bing Search Engine
Hate Rick Santorum?, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Feb. 8, 2012), http://searchengineland.com/why-does-bing-haterick-santorum-110764.
195. See generally Adam Thierer, Do We Need a Ministry of Truth for the Internet?, FORBES (Jan. 29, 2012),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/adamthierer/2012/01/29/do-we-need-a-ministry-of-truth-for-theinternet/#20ea49d91f51.
196. See Jeff John Roberts, A Top Google Result for the Holocaust Is Now a White Supremacist Site,
FORTUNE (Dec. 12, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/12/12/google-holocaust.
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for stories or results that are clearly and verifiably false.197 There is empirical
proof that the Earth is not flat or that its climate is warming. But even though
most scientists agree that humans contribute significantly to global warming, the
issue is not completely free from doubt.198 And some issues remain unsettled,
such as whether increases in the minimum wage reduce employment or help
employees.199 Platforms will have to adopt standards for when to implement
disclaimers or warnings, and critics will attack those standards.200 Finally, there
is the risk of expanding demands for warnings or context. Platforms that retreat
from a position of overt neutrality could face pressure to contextualize other
allegedly negative information, from critical reviews of restaurants to disputed
claims over nation-state borders. This possibility (perhaps a probability) would
likely increase firms’ reluctance to engage in express curation or discussion of
third-party content.
In addition, mainstream media outlets might improve their efficacy in
combating fake news through a shift in journalistic norms. Traditional
journalism seeks to be objective, offering balanced coverage of all positions on
an issue and leaving ultimate determinations of correctness to readers or
listeners.201 This style of reporting, reminiscent of the “marketplace of ideas”
model, came under severe stress during President Trump’s four years in
office.202 The U.S. President is perhaps the world’s pre-eminent news figure;
they have a capacity to generate and direct media coverage that is unequaled.
Past presidents elided the truth or simply lied on occasion, such as with President
Reagan’s denial that his government had authorized weapons sales to Iran in
exchange for the release of American hostages,203 President Clinton’s
falsehoods about his extramarital affair with White House intern Monica

197. See Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election, 31 J. ECON.
PERSP. 211, 213–14 (2017) (limiting their analysis of “fake news” to verifiably false news stories and noting
numerous categories of false or misleading stories that do not meet the definition).
198. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
SYNTHESIS REPORT, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUPS I, II AND III TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (R.K. Pachauri & L.A. Meyer eds., 2014).
199. See Ekaterina Jardim, Mark C. Long, Robert Plotnick, Emma van Inwegen, Jacob Vigdor & Hilary
Wething, Minimum Wage Increases, Wages, and Low-Wage Employment: Evidence from Seattle (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 23532, 2017), https://evans.uw.edu/sites/default/files/
NBER%20Working%20Paper.pdf; Rachel West, Five Flaws in a New Analysis of Seattle’s Minimum Wage,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 28, 2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/poverty/news/
2017/06/28/435220/five-flaws-new-analysis-seattles-minimum-wage.
200. See Angwin & Grassegger, supra note 173.
201. See SPJ Code of Ethics, SOC’Y OF PROF. JOURNALISTS (last updated Sept. 6, 2014),
https://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp; Ethics Guidelines, POYNTER, https://www.poynter.org/guidelines-2 (last
visited Mar. 21, 2022).
202. See, e.g., Sean Illing, How Trump Should Change the Way Journalists Understand “Objectivity”, VOX
(Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/8/4/21306919/donald-trump-media-ethics-tomrosenstiel.
203. See BOB WOODWARD, VEIL 562–64 (1987).

854

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:3

Lewinsky,204 or President Obama’s claims that his troop “surge” in Afghanistan
was working.205
Generally, though, propaganda has been the exception rather than the rule.
President Trump inverted that relationship. While media organizations worked
to increase their fact-checking to push back on Trump’s false claims, the
president tends to get the first word, with context provided later. Journalists
should strongly consider reversing the order of that presentation. If, for example,
the president makes a false claim about climate change, reporting should begin
with the context (the scientific consensus on human-driven global warming) and
then cover the chief executive’s remarks, while accurately describing them as
false or inaccurate. Research suggests there is some inertia with information
initially presented to readers, even if later explanations debunk or controvert
it.206 By starting with the issue, and then moving to what the president has to
say about it, journalists can present information accurately, with a higher chance
of comprehension, while still covering breaking news effectively.
Despite the difficulties in operationalizing norms-based interventions, they
could prove to be a potent part of a remedy for fake news.

V. PROVING GROUND: FAKE NEWS IN 2020-2021
The past year produced a deluge of fake news in the United States.207 The
COVID-19 novel coronavirus pandemic generated false claims about
disinfectants,208 root causes,209 vaccines,210 government tracking of patients,211
and a panoply of other topics. Former Vice President Joseph Biden defeated
incumbent President Donald Trump amidst a campaign awash in propaganda
about voting fraud,212 corruption in Biden’s family,213 and responsibility for the
204. See JEFFREY TOOBIN, A VAST CONSPIRACY 251–52 (1999).
205. See Thomas Gibbons-Nerf, Documents Reveal U.S. Officials Misled Public on War in Afghanistan,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/09/world/asia/afghanistan-war-documents.html.
206. See, e.g., Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political
Misperceptions, 32 POL. BEHAV. 303, 303 (2010); Zara Abrams, Controlling the Spread of Misinformation,
52 AM. PSYCH. ASS’N 44 (2021), https://www.apa.org/monitor/2021/03/controlling-misinformation.
207. See Josh A. Goldstein & Shelby Grossman, How Disinformation Evolved in 2020, BROOKINGS:
TECHSTREAM (Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-disinformation-evolved-in-2020.
208. See Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Advice for the Public: Mythbusters, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May
5,
2021),
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/advice-for-public/mythbusters#bleach.
209. Research Shows COVID-19 Was Not Manufactured in a Lab, AP NEWS (Sept. 16, 2020),
https://apnews.com/article/9391149002.
210. See REUTERS, supra note 10.
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., Philip Bump, There is Not and Has Not Been Any Credible Evidence of Significant Fraud in
the 2020 Election, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/12/14/there-isnot-has-not-been-any-credible-evidence-significant-fraud-2020-election.
213. See Matthew Brown, Fact Check: False Conspiracy Theories Allege Connection Between Biden
Victory and Ukraine, USA TODAY (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/factcheck/
2021/01/15/fact-check-conspiracy-theories-falsely-link-bidens-victory-ukraine/4149335001.
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armed attack on the U.S. Capitol on January 6th214—much of it generated by
Trump himself.215 The latest wave of fake news reinforces three conclusions
from this paper. First, propaganda is the most difficult form of fake news to
remediate, especially when it originates with senior government officials.
Second, interventions to combat fake news are complex, difficult, and only
partially effective. And lastly, fake news is an ever-shifting target—it is a
mechanism rather than a topic in itself.216
It remains challenging to combat propaganda.217 The dynamic of this type
of fake news in American politics shifted between the last two presidential
elections. In 2016, propaganda was primarily a bottom-up phenomenon: foreign
actors and other interests released politically-motivated fake news onto social
media and friendly mainstream media outlets, boosting the electoral success of
Donald Trump.218 In 2020, by contrast, propaganda started at the top—with the
president and his advisors—and moved outwards and downwards.219
Americans’ trust in government continues to wane, but for a small group of farright extremists, state-driven propaganda confirmed and reinforced their fears of
a stolen election and concomitant consequences for the mythical campaign
against Satanist child abusers.220 This Article explores the possibility that
independent, but possibly government-funded, journalism institutions and
platforms might be an effective intervention against fake news. The propaganda
campaign driven by QAnon and other allied sources, though, lumped all nonbelievers into a single unified threat, purportedly acting in concert.221
214. See Brian Stelter, Capitol Riot Denialism is Already Here, CNN (Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/
2021/01/14/media/capitol-hill-insurrection-denial/index.html.
215. See Glenn Kessler, Meg Kelly, Salvador Rizzo & Michelle Ye Hee Lee, In Four Years, President
Trump Made 30,573 False or Misleading Claims, WASH. POST (last updated Jan. 20, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-claims-database/.
216. See Davey Alba & Sheera Frenkel, From Voter Fraud to Vaccine Lies: Misinformation Peddlers Shift
Gears, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/16/technology/from-voter-fraud-tovaccine-lies-misinformation-peddlers-shift-gears.html.
217. There have been encouraging advances in understanding the structure of fake news. See, e.g., Timothy
R. Tangherlini, Shadi Shahsavari, Behnam Shahbazi, Ehsan Ebrahimzadeh & Vwani Roychowdhury, An
Automated Pipeline for the Discovery of Conspiracy and Conspiracy Theory Narrative Frameworks:
Bridgegate, Pizzagate and Storytelling on the Web, PLOS ONE (June 16, 2020), https://journals.plos.org/
plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0233879&type=printable.
218. See PHILIP N. HOWARD, BHARATH GANESH, DIMITRA LIOTSIOU, JOHN KELLY & CAMILLE FRANCOIS,
OXFORD COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA RES. PROJECT, THE IRA, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND POLITICAL
POLARIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012-2018 (2018), https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/
sites/93/2018/12/IRA-Report-2018.pdf.
219. See John Maxwell Hamilton & Kevin R. Kosar, Call It What It Is: Propaganda, POLITICO (Oct. 8,
2020), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/10/08/government-communication-propaganda-427290.
220. Jeff Tollefson, Tracking QAnon: How Trump Turned Conspiracy-Theory Research Upside Down, 590
NATURE 192, 193 (2021), https://media.nature.com/original/magazine-assets/d41586-021-00257-y/d41586-02100257-y.pdf.
221. See Kevin Roose, How ‘Save the Children’ Is Keeping QAnon Alive, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/28/technology/save-the-children-qanon.html; Kevin Roose, What Is QAnon,
the Viral Pro-Trump Conspiracy Theory?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/whatis-qanon.html (describing group as a “big tent conspiracy theory”); Ben Collins, As Trump Meets with QAnon

856

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:3

An insidious aspect of the QAnon propaganda is that it both builds upon
and moves to replace existing structures of trust and authority. The QAnon
conspiracy theory places President Trump at the center of its cosmology, and
simultaneously urges followers to reject any dissenting or questioning views.222
For those inclined to trust in government, Trump’s overt, repeated false claims
lend credibility to the propaganda;223 for those who are skeptics of the state,
QAnon and its ilk offer an alternative source of authority.224
The 2020 election cycle proved, again, that fake news is difficult to combat.
Mainstream media sources and platforms undertook invigorated efforts to
combat falsehoods: news organizations such as the Associated Press engaged in
fact-checking;225 Twitter labeled propaganda as suspect;226 Facebook initiated
a wholesale block on QAnon content;227 and YouTube blocked uploads of
videos falsely claiming that Trump had defeated Biden.228 Although some of
these interventions occurred relatively late during the electoral campaign,229
they have had at least an incremental effect, pushing some propaganda onto less
popular platforms such as Telegram and Gab.230 Still, these alternatives enable
fake news to spread, albeit likely at a slower velocity. Even the inauguration of
President Biden on January 20, 2021 did not dissuade some propaganda
adherents, although they had conclusively predicted that President Trump would

Influencers, The Conspiracy’s Adherents Beg for Dictatorship, NBC NEWS (Dec. 22, 2020),
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/trump-meets-qanon-influencers-conspiracy-theory-s-adherents-begdictatorship-n1252144.
222. Drew Harwell, Isaac Stanley-Becker, Razzan Nakhlawi & Craig Timberg, QAnon Reshaped Trump’s
Party and Radicalized Believers. The Capitol Siege May Just Be the Start., WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/01/13/qanon-capitol-siege-trump.
223. See Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, America, We Have a Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/16/opinion/trump-political-sectarianism.html.
224. See Kaleigh Rogers, Americans Were Primed to Believe the Current Onslaught of Disinformation,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 12, 2020), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/americans-were-primed-to-believe-thecurrent-onslaught-of-disinformation; Kevin Roose, Why Conspiracy Theories Are So Addictive Right Now, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/07/technology/Trump-conspiracy-theories.html.
225. See, e.g., Hope Yen, AP Fact Check: Yes, Trump Lost Election Despite What He Says, AP NEWS (May
6,
2021),
https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-michael-pence-electoral-college-elections-health2d9bd47a8bd3561682ac46c6b3873a10.
226. See Civic Integrity Positions and Policies, TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/en/our-priorities/civicintegrity (last visited Mar. 21, 2022).
227. Ben Collins & Brandy Zadrozny, Facebook Bans QAnon Across Its Platforms, NBC NEWS (Oct. 6,
2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/facebook-bans-qanon-across-its-platforms-n1242339.
228. Taylor Telford, YouTube Removes 8,000 Channels Promoting False Election Claims, WASH. POST
(Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/12/09/youtube-false-2020-election-claims/.
229. See Craig Timberg & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Silicon Valley is Getting Tougher on Trump and His
Supporters
Over
Hate
Speech
and
Disinformation,
WASH. POST
(July
10,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/07/10/hate-speech-trump-tech.
230. See Ben Collins & Brandy Zadrozny, Some QAnon Followers Lose Hope After Inauguration, NBC
NEWS (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/some-qanon-followers-struggle-inaugurationday-n1255002.
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use military force to prevent it.231 And, some private parties attacked by
propaganda fought back effectively using the court system. For example,
propaganda targeted Dominion Voting Systems, a firm that produces voting
machines, as part of a baroque conspiracy intended to rig the 2020 presidential
election.232 Dominion used the threat of legal action233 to compel retractions by
a number of its accusers,234 and is moving forward with lawsuits against
others.235
Results from these interventions are mixed at best. Fake news retains its
grip on a significant share of Americans. An NPR/Ipsos poll found that 40% of
those surveyed believed the novel coronavirus was created in a Chinese
laboratory, 39% agreed that there is a “Deep State” opposing then-President
Trump from within the U.S. government, and one-third were convinced that
electoral fraud enabled President Biden to win the presidential election.236 Each
of these falsehoods has been thoroughly debunked, but the poll results accord
with most other measures of popular views.237 Misinformation about COVID19 is widespread, affecting both Democrats and Republicans, and has had
negative effects on policies that could combat transmission and improve

231. See id.; Camila Domonoske, The QAnon “Storm” Never Struck. Some Supporters Are Wavering,
Others Steadfast, NPR (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.npr.org/sections/inauguration-day-live-updates/2021/01/20/
958907699/the-qanon-storm-never-struck-some-supporters-are-wavering-others-steadfast.
232. Jack Nicas, No, Dominion Voting Machines Did Not Delete Trump Votes, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/11/technology/no-dominion-voting-machines-did-not-delete-trumpvotes.html.
233. See, e.g., Alison Durkee, ‘Conduct Yourself Accordingly’: Dominion Warned MyPillow CEO Twice of
“Imminent” Litigation Over Election Conspiracy, FORBES (Jan. 18, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
alisondurkee/2021/01/18/dominion-voting-warned-mypillow-ceo-mike-lindell-of-imminent-litigation-overelection-conspiracy/?sh=35f5c54589c1.
234. See, e.g., Thomas Lifson, Retraction, AM. THINKER (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.americanthinker.com/
blog/2021/01/statement.html.
235. See, e.g., Alan Feuer, Dominion Voting Systems Files Defamation Lawsuit Against Pro-Trump Attorney
Sidney Powell, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/08/us/politics/dominion-votingsystems-files-defamation-lawsuit-against-pro-trump-attorney-sidney-powell.html.
236. Joel Rose, Even If It’s “Bonkers,” Poll Finds Many Believe QAnon and Other Conspiracy Theories,
WBUR NEWS (Dec. 30, 2020), https://www.wbur.org/npr/951095644/even-if-its-bonkers-poll-finds-manybelieve-qanon-and-other-conspiracy-theories.
237. See, e.g., Christopher Keating, Quinnipiac Poll: 77% of Republicans Believe There Was Widespread
Fraud in the Presidential Election; 60% Overall Consider Joe Biden’s Victory Legitimate, HARTFORD COURANT
(Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.courant.com/politics/hc-pol-q-poll-republicans-believe-fraud-20201210pcie3uqqvrhyvnt7geohhsyepe-story.html; Laura Santhanam, Most Americans Blame Trump for Capitol Attack
but are Split on His Removal, PBS NEWS HOUR (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/mostamericans-blame-trump-for-capitol-attack-but-are-split-on-his-removal; Li Zhou, About Half of Republicans
Don’t Think Joe Biden Should Be Sworn in as President, VOX (Jan. 11, 2021),
https://www.vox.com/2021/1/11/22225531/joe-biden-trump-capitol-inauguration; see generally David M.
Mayer, The Psychology of Fairness: Why Some Americans Don’t Believe the Election Results, CONVERSATION
(Dec. 21, 2020), https://theconversation.com/the-psychology-of-fairness-why-some-americans-dont-believethe-election-results-152305.
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treatment, such as wearing a mask in public.238 Informational interventions,
such as providing people with accurate graphics from the World Health
Organization about preventing COVID-19 infections, mitigated some false
beliefs, but not all of them.239 Any progress is a welcome development, though.
Lastly, fake news is a hardy perennial—the topics change, but the overall
configuration of the problem continues. Often, the same sources dispense
different information as conditions shift. Political propaganda moves from
election fraud to false rumors about the novel coronavirus vaccines.240 Hoaxes
allege that the celebrity of the moment—from Bob Dylan to Britney Spears—
has died when they are in fact still quite alive.241 Outcomes in professional sports
lead to new targets for trolls.242 And the change in presidential administrations
leaves satirists searching for new targets.243 It is for this reason that this Article
recommends structural changes to combat fake news rather than ones oriented
around a topic or person, no matter how significant either may be for a given
period of time. Misinformation is likely impossible to eradicate—8% of
Americans still believe that the moon landing was faked.244 But partial success
is success nonetheless.

CONCLUSION
Fake news presents a complex regulatory challenge in the increasingly
democratized and intermediated on-line information ecosystem. Inaccurate
information is readily created; rapidly distributed by platforms motivated more
by financial incentives than by journalistic norms or the public interest; and
consumed eagerly by users for whom it reinforces existing beliefs. Yet even as
awareness of the problem grew after the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the
meaning of the term “fake news” became increasingly disputed. This Article
takes up that definitional challenge, offering a useful taxonomy that classifies
species of fake news based on their creators’ intent to deceive and motivation.
238. See Jonathan Rothwell & Sonal Desai, How Misinformation is Distorting COVID Policies and
Behaviors, BROOKINGS (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-misinformation-isdistorting-covid-policies-and-behaviors.
239. See Emily K. Vraga & Leticia Bode, Addressing COVID-19 Misinformation on Social Media
Preemptively and Responsively, 27 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 396, 396 (2021).
240. See Alba & Frenkel, supra note 216.
241. See, e.g., Rosemary Rossi, Celebrity Death Hoaxes: 50 Famous People Who Were Reported Dead…
but Weren’t (Photos), WRAP (Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.thewrap.com/celebrity-death-hoax-jack-black-taylorswift-drake-bob-dylan.
242. See, e.g., Greg Joyce, Former Patriots Player Leads Internet’s Merciless Trolling of Bill Belichick,
N.Y. POST (Jan. 25, 2021), https://nypost.com/2021/01/25/tom-bradys-conquest-led-to-merciless-bill-belichicktrolling.
243. See, e.g., Frank Pallotta, How Colbert, Kimmel and Fallon Plan to Adapt to Life After Trump, CNN
(Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/24/media/late-night-trump-colbert-fallon-snl/index.html. But see
Joe Biden, ONION, https://www.theonion.com/tag/joseph-biden (last visited Mar. 21, 2022) (cataloguing satire
of now-President Joseph Biden by The Onion for over a decade).
244. See Rose, supra note 236.
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In particular, it identifies four key categories: satire, hoax, propaganda, and
trolling. This analytical framework will help policymakers and commentators
alike by providing greater rigor to debates over the issue.
The fake news phenomenon has key structural problems that make it
difficult to design interventions that can address fake news effectively. These
include the ease with which authors can produce user-generated content online,
and the financial stakes that platforms have in highlighting and disseminating
that material. Authors often have a mixture of motives in creating content,
making it less likely that a single solution will be effective. Consumers of fake
news have limited incentives to invest in challenging or verifying its content,
particularly when the material reinforces their existing beliefs and perspectives.
Finally, fake news rarely appears alone: it is frequently mingled with more
accurate stories, such that it becomes harder to categorically reject a source as
irredeemably flawed.
Despite these challenges, this Article suggests a set of potential
interventions grounded in law, architecture, markets, and norms to mitigate the
harms from fake news. In particular, it argues for strengthening the immunity
provided by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act; building
platforms governed by trusted entities that are not driven solely by advertising
revenues; using code to prioritize or deprecate information on sites; and
encouraging news outlets and social media applications alike to use their voices
to combat fake news directly.
Fake news is not new: it has a long, troubling provenance, stretching from
newspaper reports blaming the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine on Spain in 1898
through today.245 It is a persistent, hardy problem in a world of networked social
information. This Article’s framework creates a foundation to help advance
dialogue about fake news and to suggest tools that might mitigate its most
pernicious aspects.

245. See Chris Woolf, Back in the 1890s, Fake News Helped Start a War, PRI (Dec. 8, 2016),
https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-12-08/long-and-tawdry-history-yellow-journalism-america.
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